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Abstract
Prisoners with a history of self-harm have reported experiencing more anger (e.g.,
Hilbrand, Krystal, Sharpe, & Foster, 1994), and despair (e.g., Shea, 1993), and less
ability to cope (e.g., Shea, 1993; Liebling, 1992) than prisoners with no history of selfharm. This suggests that intense negative affective experiences and less control over
these states might be pervasive characteristics in individuals vulnerable to self-harm. The
present study tested the hypotheses that high affect intensity, the tendency to experience
both positive and negative emotional states intensely (Larsen & Diener, 1987), and
deficits in negative affect regulation would be associated with self-harm behaviour.
Twenty prisoners with a history of self-harm and twenty control prisoners rated
emotional responsiveness on a modified version of the Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen
& Diener, 1987), and the utility of strategies to decrease intense negative affective states
on an affect regulation strategies checklist (ARSC). Prisoners with a history of self-harm
reported experiencing significantly more intense levels of negative affect and less
experience of serene states than control prisoners. Positive affect intensity levels did not
differ between groups. The self-harm group reported utilising a significantly more
varied, but less efficient, repertoire of affect regulation strategies. They also rated
cognitive strategies significantly lower and aggressive strategies significantly higher.
Results suggest that screening prisoners for intense negative emotional responsiveness
and dysfunctional affect regulation may facilitate the identification and management of
prisoners vulnerable to self-harm. Further research is required to validate the dimensions
of the AIM(M) and the ARSC, and explore the mechanisms of intense negative affective
experiences and self-harm behaviour.
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CHAPTER ONE - SELF-HARM, AFFECT INTENSITY,
AND AFFECT REGULATION
The prevention of self-destructive acts is of particular concern to correctional providers
who are legally responsible for prisoners' well-being. Moreover, suicide in prisons has become a
source of public concern, particularly since the Royal Commission into Deaths in Custody in
Australia that identified the need for strategies to reduce suicides in custodial settings (Biles &
McDonald, 1992). Other self-destructive acts that occur in prison environments, such as
attempted suicide and other forms of self-harm, equally warrant investigation so that strategies
can be employed to reduce their prevalence. However, this task is particularly difficult because
many stressors are commonly experienced in prison that could motivate a self-destructive act
such as separation from family, criminal justice procedures (e.g., court appearances, sentencing,
Parole-Board hearings), and dangers inherent in prison environments (e.g., personal threats,
violence) (Toch,1992). It may well be important, therefore, to identify characteristic styles of
responding to situational stressors that increase the likelihood of self-destructive behaviour.
There has not been a great deal of research investigating individual difference
characteristics discriminating prisoners vulnerable to suicide and self-harm. Studies that have
examined records of prisoners who have committed suicide (e.g., Topp, 1979; Dooley, 1990;
Backett, 1987) have been limited to demographic, health, and criminological factors. These
studies have not identified powerful predictive characteristics. Factors associated with suicide,
such as a history of substance use, psychiatric disorder, and first time imprisoned, are also
prevalent in the general prison population and are therefore limited in their utlity to identify those
vulnerable to future suicidal behaviour.
Research focussing on individuals who self-harm provides more scope for examining a
broader range of variables such as characteristic affective experiences, cognitive processes and
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behaviour. These factors can be examined when prisoners are received and provide insight into
appropriate types of interventions and management styles for staff. Prisoners with a history of
self-harm are also vulnerable to committing further acts of self-harm (e.g., Hillbrand, Krystal,
Sharpe, & Foster, 1994; Morgan, Barton, Pottle, Pocock & Bums-Cox, 1976, Wanstall & Oei,
1989) and suicide (e.g., Topp, 1979; Dooley, 1990; Backett, 1987), so strategies that assist
prisoners vulnerable to self-harm will also assist in preventing suicides in prisons.
In the present context, self-harm is defined as an act of self-inflicted and deliberate harm,
regardless of whether death was the intended outcome. This definition therefore encompasses
attempted suicide. Self-harm and attempted suicide are sometimes differentiated on the basis of
intent to die (e.g., Van Egmond & Diekstra, 1989), but this categorisation is not employed here as
the purpose of this study is to examine pervasive factors that distinguish prisoners vulnerable to
self-inflicted destructive behaviour, regardless of intended outcome. Previous research has also
infrequently provided adequate definitions of self-harm behaviour. Where definitions have been
given, they are indicated in the review below.

A Behavioural Basis for Incidents of Self-harm
Insight into the experiences associated with self-harm provides both an explanation for its
incidence and a means of initial exploration of individual difference characteristics that may
differentiate prisoners vulnerable to acts of self-harm. Studies such as those by Bach-y-rita
(1974), Wanstall and Oei, (1989), and Pattison and Kahan (1993) have identified common
patterns of self-reported negative affect prior to committing an act of self harm. Furthermore,
this emotional experience is combined with negative cognition such as an inability to divert
attention from negative situations. These studies have also suggested that there are some
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immediate positive consequences of self-harm behaviour, such as emotional relief, thereby
reinforcing these acts and providing a behavioural basis for their incidence.
Factors that maintain self-harm behaviour have been described by Bach-y-Rita (1974)
who assessed eight men who had committed multiple acts of self-harm in a special prison unit for
violent offenders. The men sometimes reported that they attempted to manipulate their
circumstances by committing acts of self-harm, although each of them reported feeling depressed
prior to these acts and relief afterwards. Self-harm occurred more while in isolation, when
external controls (presumably constraints imposed by their situation in prison) evoked
frustration, and when the men could not act on their feelings. Self-harm, therefore, provided
resolution to negative emotional states and situations, but was enacted when limitations restricted
the means available for responding to these situational stressors.
A more comprehensive examination of factors associated with self-harm was conducted
by W anstall and Oei ( 1989) who reviewed literature examining the psychological aspects of
'delicate wrist-cutting behaviour' in adult psychiatric patients. This is the most common form of
self-harm and refers to the act of deliberately inflicting superficial delicate incisions, generally on
the wrist. Their review also suggested that learning theory explains the incidence of delicate
wrist-cutting as common patterns of antecedents and consequences were associated with the acts.
Antecedents to self-harm included patients becoming increasingly tense and anxious, and then
gradually isolating themselves and becoming self-absorbed. Consequences of self-harm included
relief of tension, feelings of relaxation, pleasure in seeing blood, and attention from staff. These
consequences would appear to, at least in some cases, reduce the intense negative affect, modify
cognition, and change negative aspects of their situation preceding self-harm, thus reinforcing
subsequent acts.
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Similar factors were recognised by Pattison and Kahan (1993), who examined fifty-six
published cases of low lethality self-harm. They identified four predominant psychological
factors experienced prior to an act of self-harm; namely despair (defined as an intolerable
emotion), anxiety, anger, and cognitive constriction. Although they did not specify how these
experiences were assessed, their review suggested that prior to an act of self-harm individuals
experience negative affective states and an inability to divert or modify cognition from the
negative aspects of their situation and motivation to self-harm. Seventy percent of the case
studies demonstrated despair prior to an act of self-harm suggesting that, consistent with
experiences common to individuals who commit suicide (Shneidman, 1989), intense
psychological pain is generally experienced prior to an act of self-harm. Pattison and Kahan
state,d that these psychological factors were relatively consistent amongst those who committed
single and multiple acts of self-harm, suggesting that intense negative affect and cognitive
constriction are factors which are important in the incidence of self-harm, regardless of the
history of the behaviour.
The above studies suggest that negative affective experiences may play an important role
in precipitating acts of self-harm. Dysfunctional cognitive processes, such as focussing on
negative situations, and certain behaviours, such as social isolation, may also be pivotal.
Behaviour theory offers a frame-work to explain how various factors reinforce the incidence of
self-harm as a response to stressors that elicit negative affect and negative cognition. The
importance of reinforcing factors is exemplified in therapy styles which emphasise identifying
antecedent and consequent conditions to self-harm incidents, and developing alternative
behaviours to replace self-harm when antecedent factors occur. Shearin and Linehan (1994), for
example, found that self-harm incidents were reduced in clients with borderline personality
disorder undertaking this type of therapy compared to clients receiving other types of therapy.
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Psychological Processes and Self-harm
Consistent with the notion that self-harm occurs as a maladaptive response to stressors,
Liebling ( 1992) has suggested that prisoners who self-harm can be differentiated from other
prisoners on the basis of coping skills. She compared fifty juvenile prisoners who required
hospital treatment due to acts of self-harm with a random sample of fifty juvenile prisoners with
no record of self-harm on a range of criminological and demographic variables. The groups did
not differ in age, ethnicity, and offences, but those who had engaged in self-harm also received
more psychiatric treatment, had greater drinking problems, and fewer friends. Semi-structured
interviews suggested that juveniles with a history of self-harm could be differentiated from the
control group by the extent of background deprivation reported, and an inability to cope with the
prison environment because of conflict with inmates and less contact with families in the prison
setting. She proposed that stressful situations, such as receiving an unexpectedly long sente.nce
or separating from a partner, combined with an inability to problem-solve, propelled inmates
toward suicidal behaviour. However, problem solving ability or other skills to manage stressors,
were not compared between groups using standardised measures.
Toch (1992) reported extensively on the types of strategies that prisoners use to cope with
imprisonment. He interviewed over three-hundred prisoners in New York correctional facilities
who were known to have committed acts of self-harm or attempted suicide, and compared this
group with a smaller control group matched for age and ethnicity. Prisoners were interviewed
regarding their responses to crises experienced within prison. Three types of personal breakdowns, resulting in incidents of self-harm, were identified, namely, problems with the prison
environment (e.g., an inability to tolerate specific placements, such as solitary confinement),
perceived personal inadequacies (e.g., feelings of worthlessness associated with criminal
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careers), and a lack of impulse control (e.g., rage). Toch proposed that control prisoners had
survived stress by 'harnessing' rather than being controlled by it. They achieved this by
employing supports (e.g., confiding in trusted friends), suppressing involvement with the outside,
taking a detached stance, using distraction, or shutting off negative affect when crises arose.
However Toch, like Liebling (1992), employed semi-structured interviews and did not assess
whether prisoners with a history of self-harm could be differentiated from other prisoners on the
basis of deficits in utilising these strategies.
The mechanisms of suicidal behaviour, including self-harm, were more
specifically explored by Ivanoff and Jang ( 1991) who used a number of standardised
measures. They examined the relationship between hopelessness, social desirability, and
a range of criminological factors in a sample of 130 prisoners. Four groups of prisoners
participated: prisoners who had inflicted self-harm within the past year, prisoners who
had inflicted self-harm at some time but not in the previous year, prisoners with a history
of a psychiatric disorder, and a control group of prisoners that had no history of suicidal
behaviour or contact with prison mental health services. These groups were administered
the Scale for Suicidal Ideation (SSI) (Beck, Kovacs, & Weissman, 1979) that comprises
subscales of suicidal desire (the degree, frequency, and duration of suicidal thoughts), and
suicidal preparation (suicidal preoccupations such as methods of self-harm and factors
that provoke or deter self-harm incidents); the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) (Beck,
Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974) (that measures cognition associated with pessimism);
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendleson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961);
the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (Edwards, 1970); the Suicidal Behaviours
Interview adapted from the Suicidal Behaviors Questionnaire (Linehan & Nielson, 1981);
and the Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). A multivariate
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causal model was devised using the ordinary least squares regression method. Various
factors, such as length of sentence and number of negative life events, indirectly affected
suicidal factors (previous suicidal behaviour, current suicidal ideation and anticipated
suicidal behaviour) by increasing levels of depression or hopelessness. For example,
inmates with a history of juvenile delinquency and violent crimes had elevated levels of
depression and showed more current suicidal ideation. Social desirability had no direct
effect on suicidal factors or on hopelessness, but higher levels of social desirability were
associated with low levels of depression. Hopelessness and social desirability interacted
in that the ability of hopelessness to predict suicidal behaviour decreased as levels of
social desirability increased. The relationship between individuals' tendency to act in a
socially desirable manner and self-harm, therefore, seems to be consolidated by
pessimism and concomitant feelings of hopelessness in response to negative life events,
although the dimensions of social desirability in this study were not clearly defined.
Results suggest, however, that there may be utility in identifying various dysfunctional
cognitive styles that occur when negative affective states are elevated to predict suicidal
behaviour,

To test the transactional theory that suicidal behaviour is associated with a predisposition
to dysfunctional cognitive processing, Schmidtke and Schaller ( 1992) administered various
measures to assess whether individuals with a history of attempted suicide perceived their
environment as undifferentiated, inarticulated and global. This theory suggests that individuals
are prone to commit suicide when a rigid and indiscriminate cognitive style is coupled with
negative situational factors that result in the individual believing their situation is unchangeable
and ill fated. Patients admitted to a psychiatric ward after a suicide attempt and groups of
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psychiatric and normal controls were assessed at three times. The suicide group was tested
within a week of the attempted suicide, approximately twenty days later, and on discharge. Three
cognitive styles were investigated, namely, cognitive rigidity, dichotomous thinking, and field
dependence (although no details of these terms were provided). A German version of the Stroop
test was used to assess cognitive rigidity, a semantic differential task (Neuringer, 1961) was used
to assess dichotomous thinking, and field dependence was assessed in a group embedded figures
task (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). The Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger,
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), the Eysenk Personality Inventory (Eysenk & Eysenk, 1964), and the
Beck Depression Inventory were also administered. Results indicated that both clinical groups
were more rigid thinkers and had greater field dependence than the normal controls at initial
testing but not at subsequent testing. Measures of dichotomous thinking did not differ between
the groups. Depressive symptoms, emotional !ability, state anxiety and trait anxiety did not differ
between the clinical groups, but were significantly higher than normal controls at initial testing.
These affective states, including trait anxiety, decreased significantly for both clinical groups
over the measurement period to the same level as controls. Schmidtke and Schaller concluded
that their results did not support the transactional theory that suicidal individuals are generally
predisposed to global or rigid thinking, as significant improvements in rigid thinking and field
dependence were demonstrated when emotional states returned to normal levels. However, this
does not preclude the possibility that individuals who self-harm have a propensity towards
experiencing intense depression and anxiety, which then affects cognitive processes, when
situational stressors occur.
The association between suicidal behaviour and poor interpersonal problem-solving was
examined by Schotte, Cools and Payvar ( 1990) in 36 consecutive inpatients to a psychiatric ward
who reported suicidal ideation. Thirty-nine percent had made an attempt prior to admission and
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almost a fifth had a history of previous attempts. Participants were tested either on admission
and a week later, or only a week later, to assess possible practice effects. The Beck Depression
Inventory, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the Beck Hopelessness Scale, the Scale for Suicidal
Ideation, and the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedure (MEPS) (Platt, Spivack, & Bloom,
1975), that presents stories that require participants to specify means of interpersonal problemsolving, were administered. Participants tested both times showed significant improvement on
each of the measures, including interpersonal problem-solving ability, over time. The group
tested twice and the group tested only a week later performed equally well a week after
admission, suggesting that improvements were not accounted for by practice effects. Consistent
with Schmidtke and Schaller ( 1992), these results also suggested that deficits in cognitive
processing were not traits associated with individuals vulnerable to suicidal behaviour, although
high states of negative affect were associated with deficits in cognition. Schotte et al. suggested,
therefore, that a state vulnerability model, as opposed to a trait vulnerability model, better
explained the results of their study. This assertion, however, ignores the possibility that suicidal
behaviour might instead be associated with a predisposition to emotional dysregulation, that
affects cognitive processing when negative affective states are high.
Ivanoff, Smyth, Grochowski, Jang and Klein ( 1992) also investigated interpersonal
problem-solving skills and self-harm in ninety-three prisoners with and without a history of selfharm. Prisoners with a history of self-harm were further divided into those with and without
current suicidal ideation. Ivanoff et al. administered the MEPS, the BDI, the BHS and the Prison
Suicidal Behaviours Interview. Currently suicidal individuals with a history of self-harm differed
significantly from comparison groups on measures of hopelessness and depression, however,
there was no difference between any of the groups in their problem-solving ability. Unlike
Schotte et al.' s ( 1990) results, MEPS scores did not vary according to levels of hopelessness and
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depression although participants in the Schotte, et al. study demonstrated higher levels of
negative affective states. Ivanoff et al. suggested that problem-solving ability does not seem to
predispose individuals to suicidal ideation although immediately prior to an act of self-harm,
distress may reach a level that affects problem-solving ability. Alternatively, the MEPS may not
have been sensitive in discriminating interpersonal problem-solving skills in their sample given.
A prison sample might not have easily identified with the problems presented in the MEPS.
Although deficits in interpersonal problem-solving ability might not be a pervasive factor
discriminating prisoners vulnerable to self-harm, Hillbrand et al. (1994) found that self-harm was
associated with aggression. Fifty male forensic inpatients who had engaged in at least one selfharm incident scored significantly higher on outward directed aggression compared to fifty
co~parison forensic patients, as assessed by the Overt Aggression Scale (Yudofsky, Silver,
Jackson, Endicott, & Williams, 1986). More verbal aggression and physical aggression against
objects and people were reported in the self-harm group, suggesting that demonstration of these
behaviours may indicate vulnerablity to self-harm. This finding is also consistent with
conceptualising self-harm as indicative of a pervasive means of responding dysfunctionally to
stressors.
A broader examination of personality factors related to self-harm was undertaken by Shea
(1993) who explored the association between self-harm and scores on sub-scales of the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The MMPI was administered to thirty
prisoners with a history of self-harm and thirty control prisoners who were matched for age, race
and IQ. The self-harm group comprised individuals who had experienced at least two self-harm
incidents that were assessed as low lethality, required medical attention, and were documented by
prison officials. The control group was selected from referrals for psychological evaluations for
reasons other than self-harm. Focussing on clinical scales which were significantly different at
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the .001 level, as thirteen scales were compared using t-tests, the self-harm group were
significantly higher on three scales. These scales were depression, psychasthenia (anxiety and
obsessive thinking), and social introversion. The self-harm group's scores, therefore, reflected a
greater experience of distress, manifested by feelings of anxiety, depression and persecution; and
a perception that they had fewer resources to deal with their problems. Responses also suggested
that they experienced significantly more self and other alienation and feelings of isolation and
withdrawal. Impulsive behaviour was also reported more by the self-harm group compared to
control group prisoners. Prisoners with a history of self-harm, therefore, may be differentiated
from other prisoners on their more frequent experience of extreme negative affect, a tendency to
perceive themselves as less able to deal with stressors, and more impulsive and socially
withdrawn behaviour. These results provide some detail as to the profile of prisoners vulnerable
to self-harm on the basis of a standardised measure, although discriminating characteristics, such
as alienation and poor resourcefulness, are complex factors. The aspects of these characteristics
that would indicate vulnerability to self-harm require exploration. Identifying the specific factors
would circumvent the laborious task of administering the MMPI to identify prisoners at risk of
self-harm. In addition, although Shea's research suggests that problems in emotional and social
functioning may be paramount in discriminating risk, classification analyses were not conducted
on the data suggesting that validation of these results is required.
Intense and frequent negative affective states, primarily depression, hopelessness, anxiety,
and anger, are invariably associated with self-harm. These experiences are commonly reported
by individuals prior to acts of self-harm (e.g., Pattison & Kahan, 1993) and are generally
significantly higher as assessed by standardised measures (e.g., Shea, 1993) in self-harm or other
suicidal behaviour groups compared to control groups. Poor problem-solving (Schotte et al .. ,
1990) and other cognitive deficits (e.g., Schmidtke & Schaller, 1992) have also been
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demonstrated following acts of self-harm. However, these cognitive functions have improved
significantly when negative affective states have decreased, or are not evident if affective states
are not sufficiently intense (Ivanoff et al., 1992). Aggressive (Hillbrand et al., 1994) and
impulsive (Shea, 1993) behaviour have also been self-reported as significantly more common in
individuals with a history of self-harm suggesting this group engages in more pervasive
dysfunctional behaviour, in addition to self-harm. Although Liebling ( 1992) and Toch ( 1992)
have suggested that poor coping differentiates self-harm groups from control groups, these
conclusions have not been made on the basis of standardised measures and hence require
systematic examination to ascertain discriminating factors. Shea (1993) and Ivanoff and Jang
( 1991) have taken measures of self-harm groups' perception of coping resources and social
desirability, respectively, although again the dimensions comprising these factors have not been
adequately articulated to identify an individual difference characteristic that provides utility for
devising specific assessment and intervention strategies.
Although intense negative affective states are not consistently present in those
who attempt suicide (e.g. Schmidtke & Shaller, 1992; Schotte et al., 1990), they might
nonetheless be experienced more frequently and be associated with a pattern of
dysfunctional responding, increasing vulnerability to future acts. Characteristic
experiences of intense negative affect and a lack of effective strategies to reduce these
aversive states might therefore discriminate prisoners vulnerable to self-harm. An
individual difference factor that might be important in this respect is affect intensity.

Affect Intensity
Affect intensity describes the typical level of intensity experienced by individuals in
emotional situations and hence is a pervasive characteristic that might serve as a useful factor to
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identify prisoners vulnerable to self-harm behaviour. Larsen and Diener (1987) have proposed
that some individuals typically experience both positive and negative emotions intensely (ie.,
have high affect intensity), while others experience more subdued emotional responsiveness (ie.,
have low affect intensity).
Larsen and Diener ( 1987) suggested that affect intensity functions as a means of
regulating arousal and that differences exist in the methods by which individuals regulate arousal
depending on predispositions to under-arousal and over-arousal. They review research
suggesting that those who experience high affect intensity are under-aroused at baseline levels, so
increases in emotional responsiveness enable optimal levels of arousal to be achieved. The
opposite is true for individuals who experience low affect intensity as increases in emotional
responsiveness are not required to increase arousal, due to over-arousal at baseline levels.
The affect intensity construct was developed by assessing the intensity of positive and
negative emotional responses using affect adjective check-lists daily over a period of weeks.
Larsen and Diener ( 1987) reported that across four different studies of daily mood, a correlation
of between .70 and .77 was found between positive and negative emotions. Thus they proposed
that affect intensity is a uni-dimensional construct. To circumvent the laborious task of
calculating daily mood over a long period of time, Larsen and Diener ( 1987) devised an affect
intensity measure, the AIM.
The AIM is a 40-item questionnaire that assesses an individual's typical intensity of
emotional responsiveness. Items refer to specific subjective experiences of positive affect, such
as 'When I accomplish something difficult I feel delighted or elated', and negative affect, such as
'Sad movies deeply touch me'. Several items assess high levels of arousal, such as 'My heart
races at the anticipation of some exciting event', and several reversed items assess low levels of
arousal, such as 'When I'm happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than being
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zestful and aroused'. Participants are required to indicate on a six-point Likert-type scale how
frequently these experiences have occurred for them, from Never to Always. AIM scores are
then calculated by obtaining the mean value of the forty items. Global measures are proposed as
an index of the level of affect intensity for both positive and negative affective experiences.

In reviewing research pertaining to the reliability of the AIM, Larsen and Diener ( 1987)
reported that test/retest reliability varied from approximately .80 over one to three months, to .75
for a two-year period. The AIM, therefore, seems to be reliable in that its assessment of an
individual's affect intensity level is consistent over time. Such temporal reliability is consistent
with the notion that affect intensity is a stable temperament characteristic.
AIM scores correlate with individuals' emotional responsiveness to daily events
providing support for the validity of the AIM as a measure of typical experience of emotional
intensity. Larsen, Diener and Emmons ( 1986) conducted a study in which 176 undergraduates
completed the AIM and rated a 30-item Event Reaction Questionnaire, that described positive
and negative daily events previously identified by college students. Participants were asked to
rate their emotional reaction to each event using a ten-point scale that went from extreme
positive emotions (e.g., euphoria) to extreme negative emotions (e.g., despair). Analysis of
Variance CANOVA) comparing the highest and lowest quartile of AIM scoring participants
demonstrated that high AIM scorers reported both good and bad events as eliciting significantly
more intense emotional responsiveness than low AIM scorers, and there was no interaction.
These results support the validity of the AIM as a measure of the typical intensity of affective
experiences to emotional situations.
Larsen et al. (1986) administered three additional measures in this study to examine the
relationship between affect intensity and arousability, sensation-seeking, and emotional
reactivity. These were the Stimulus Screening Scale (Mehrabian, 1979), that measured the
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ability to screen irrelevant sensory stimuli and hence assessed susceptibility to arousal, the
Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1979), that measured the tendency to seek out situations
that provide high levels of stimulation, and the Reactivity sub-scale of the Mood Survey
(Underwood & Froming, 1980) that measured mood variability. AIM scores correlated with
measures of arousability (! = .32) and emotional reactivity(!= .25) suggesting that participants
with high affect intensity were more easily aroused and experienced more mood variability. AIM
scores did not correlate with sensation seeking(!= -.001) suggesting that individuals' affect
intensity was not associated with initiating behaviour for emotional stimulation. Affect intensity
was therefore associated with frequency of emotional reactions and arousability, but is distinct
from these because it describes characteristic intensity of responses rather than frequency of
affective experiences.
Larsen, Diener and Cropanzano (1987) investigated cognitive processes associated with
depression (Beck, 1976) and affect intensity. Three categories of cognition were assessed,
namely, personalisation, or self-referential cognition; selective abstraction, in which cognition
focuses on the emotion-provoking aspects of events; and overgeneralisation, in which a general
state of affairs is construed from a single event. In their first study, 280 undergraduates
completed the AIM and were exposed to a series of slides classified as negative, neutral and
positive, although no manipulation check was conducted to assess the validity of these
classifications. When viewing the slides, participants indicated their agreement with nine
statements, three derived from each of the cognitive categories. Approximately half of the
statements separated high and low quartile AIM scorers in a step-wise discriminant function
analysis for positive (Wilk's Lambda= .84) and negative slides (Wilk's Lambda= .74). In both
analyses, the high AIM scorers were more likely to think about how they felt (personalise), to
focus on the best or worst part of the slide (selectively abstract), and to think about how good or
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evil the world is (generalise) in response to the slides. These results suggest that there is an
association between experiencing affect intensely and cogitating on the nature of events and/or
self, in response to emotion provoking situations.

In their second study Larsen et al. (1987) administered the AIM to 109 undergraduate
participants and asked them to write down any thoughts or other reactions experienced while
viewing a sub-set of slides from the first study. Four raters then classified participants' responses
into one of eight categories for comparison between high and low AIM groups. The three
cognitive categories outlined above were subdivided into more specific categories.
Personalisation comprised 'personalising' and 'empathic statements'; overgeneralisation
comprised 'global statements' and 'fantasy elaboration'; and selective abstraction comprised
'foe:us on feelings' and 'emotional details', although on what basis these categories were
determined was not clear. Two further categories, 'physical sensations' and 'emotional arousal',
were also used as a manipulation check. T-tests confirmed that significantly more emotional
responses to the positive and negative slides were elicited overall compared to the neutral slides.
Response categories discriminated the highest 27 and the lowest 21 AIM scorers for positive
(except for 'focus on feelings' and 'emotional details' categories) and negative (except for the
'emotional details' category) slides. High AIM scoring participants were more likely to
experience personalisation and overgeneralisation but their experience of selective abstraction
was similar to the low scoring AIM group. Some differences in cognition are therefore apparent
between those who experience high and low affect intensity when they are exposed to positive
and negative emotion eliciting stimuli. The consequences of these cognitive processes were not
explored although, because the categories described processes experienced in depression,
possible negative consequences might be prolonging intense negative experiences and an
inability to enact other actitivities.
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Affect intensity is thus proposed as a pervasive characteristic whereby individuals with
high affect intensity tend to experience positive and negative emotions more intensely than those
who are low on affect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987). The immediate consequences for
individuals who experience high affect intensity include high levels of physiological arousal and
strong subjective experiences of emotion when emotion-provoking stimuli are experienced.
Characteristic intensity of affective experiences is also associated with the frequency of
emotional reactions and arousability but is theoretically distinct from these (Larsen et al., 1986).
Particular cognitive experiences, such as personalisation and overgeneralisation, have also been
demonstrated in individuals high on affect intensity in response to emotional stimuli (Larsen, et
al., 1987). Sensation-seeking behaviour is not associated with affect intensity (Larsen et al.,
1986), and other behavioural responses associated with affect intensity have not been explored.
Larsen and Diener (1987), however, have also noted that an individual's subjective wellbeing is determined by the frequency of affective experiences in conjunction with the intensity
with which they are experienced, or the ratio of positive to negative affect experienced over time.
In this respect, individuals who encounter frequent negative events will experience varying
subjective well-being depending on their level of affect intensity. Individuals in this position
who are high in affect intensity will experience acute and agitated negative affect, distress, and
depression whereas individuals who are low in affect intensity will experience milder but
persistent unhappiness. Conversely, if relatively frequent positive affective experiences are
encountered, subjective well-being for individuals who are high in affect intensity will
incorporate feelings such as exuberance and joyfulness compared to those who are low in affect
intensity, who will experience contentment and serenity.
Therefore, the nature and frequency of affective experiences determines an individual's
overall well-being, and affect intensity mediates the character of those experiences. An
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additional factor that impinges on well-being, however, concerns the nature of responses elicited
to intense negative affect, and their consequences for reducing these states. The identification of
functional responses to reduce aversive states has been explored in the area of coping. Although
the vast literature on coping has not conclusively identified the dimensions involved in
responding to negative situations (See Parker & Endler, 1992, for a review), it has provided some
insight into strategies invoked to regulate negative affect and their consequences for subjective
well being. This issue is particularly important in the context of investigating individual
difference characteristics that might discriminate vulnerability to self-harm in that those who
engage in self-harm might have a dysfunctional response style to negative affective states.

Coping and Affect Regulation
Coping refers to the various responses an individual employs to manage negative
situational stressors, including the affects of these such as distress. When intense negative
affective experiences are encountered as a result of stressors, various experiences may occur.
These include subjective emotional experiences, such as depression, anxiety and anger, arousal
responses, such as shaking and increased respiration, (Larsen & Diener, 1987), and various
cognitive processes, such as focussing on the nature of the stimuli (Larsen et al., 1987). As
suggested above, the typical intensity of affect experienced in conjunction with the frequency of
situational stressors determines subjective well-being. However, this assertion does not take
account of individual differences in the types of responses elicited to reduce negative affective
experiences. Parker and Endler (1992) have proposed that the strategies employed in response to
reactions to negative situational stressors determine subjective well-being, such as psychological
distress and somatic complaints and, subsequently, whether individuals are 'good' or 'bad'
copers. Toch ( 1992) also identified important differences in coping ability when he concluded
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that prisoners who did not self-harm or attempt suicide in response to prison crises 'harnessed'
stress, rather than were controlled by it. To do this they employed various strategies that
included social support or being emotionally detached from problems. Subjective well-being,
therefore, might be determined by either not experiencing intense negative affect frequently
and/or by responding with functional strategies when intense negative affective states occur.
Parker and Endler (1992) have suggested that the types of responses employed by
individuals to cope with negative situational stressors have been categorised into two main
dimensions. They reviewed thirteen measures in the coping literature and found that nine
identified emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping as central mechanisms. Parker
and Endler stated that emotion-focused coping refers to emotional responses, self pre-occupation,
and fantasising, whereas problem-focused coping refers to responses used to solve a problem or
cognitively reframe it. A number of additional constructs have been proposed, such as
avoidance-focussed coping that involves employing strategies to distract attention from the
source of stress. However, no consensus exists on the structure of coping or even the elements
that comprise the various types of coping. Parker and Endler suggested that the coping literature
has had limited theoretical and empirical advances due to the psychometric inadequacies of
measures used. The number of scales alone in the thirteen measures they examined ranged from
three to twelve, which has limited the validity and generalisability of results. Such disparity
within the field of coping exemplifies the complexity of responses that can be initiated in
response to stressors. An alternative approach, rather than attempting to encompass all types of
responses, is to limit the scope under examination. One such limitation is to focus on responses
directed to the reduction of aversive emotional states.
Affect regulation in the current context concerns strategies employed to reduce any type
of negative affective state, that primarily includes experiences such as stress or other symptoms
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of anxiety (such as those concerned with arousal), depression, and anger. This is conceptually
different from coping, which has primarily focussed on the relationship between situational
stressors and strategies in response to these, rather than the reduction of negative affective
experiences specifically. Miller's (1992) review of research on coping with health problems,
however, has provided some insight into individual differences in coping that relate to the notion
of affect regulation. She has suggested that certain strategies transfer focus from the threatening
aspects of a situation, so that stress can be reduced. Her review suggested that individuals who
used strategies that diverted attention from the source of stress and modulated internal arousal,
such as using relaxation techniques or reinterpreting the situation, most effectively achieved the
regulation of stress. These strategies enabled aversive events to be processed more efficiently
because anxiety was reduced. Individuals who focussed on aspects of a threatening situation and
tended to spend less time averting attention away from their situation maintained high levels of
stress. However, Miller noted that the effectiveness of these strategies varied depending on the
degree of control participants could exercise over their situation. Where control existed,
focussing attention on the threatening aspects of a situation and seeking information on the
source of a stressor had a positive effect on reducing stress.
Functional means of reducing intense negative affect therefore includes strategies that
avoid and reinterpret the threatening aspects of stressors that cannot be controlled, and
addressing issues concerned with a stressor where control can be exerted, to assist in alleviating
subjective emotional experiences and arousal responses. The identification of prisoners who do
not have an effective repertoire of strategies enabling the alleviation of intense negative affective
states might therefore assist in identifying vulnerability to self-harm.
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The Present Study
The research reviewed on self-harm suggests that self-harm incidents are associated with
intense negative affect such as depression, hopelessness and anger (e.g., Pattison & Kahan,
1993). Individuals with a history of self-harm have also reported experiencing greater distress
and less ability to deal with their problems (e.g., Shea, 1993), have a greater tendency to be
impulsive (e.g., Shea, 1993), while also employing more dysfunctional behaviour such as social
withdrawal (e.g. Shea, 1993), and acts of aggression (e.g., Hillbrand et al., 1994), compared to
those with no history of self-harm. The factors that mediate intense negative affect and
subsequent dysfunctional behaviour are not clear, although various cognitive states such as high
levels of hopelessness (a significant aspect of this state is pessimistic cognition), rigid thinking
(e.g., Schmidtke & Shaller, 1992), and poor interpersonal problem-solving (e.g., Schotte et al.,
1990) have been associated with self-harm behaviour. These dysfunctional cognitive processes,
however, have not been demonstrated when affective states were not at intense levels. This
suggests that individuals vulnerable to self-harm migght have a tendency to experience intense
emotional responsiveness and hence have high levels of affect intensity. This tendency might
also be coupled with problems eliciting functional affect regulation strategies when experiencing
intense negative affect, resulting in patterns of dysfunctional, including harmful, means of
reducing aversive states.
The present study was devised to test the hypotheses that high affect intensity and
dysfunctional affect regulation strategies are associated with self-harm in prisoners. If supported,
this hypothesis suggests that assessing characteristic emotional responsiveness and use of affect
regulation strategies might assist in the identification of prisoners at risk of self-harm, and
provide a basis for the formulation of intervention and management plans in vulnerable
prisoners. Specifically, prisoners with a history of self-harm were expected to score higher on a
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measure of affect intensity than prisoners with no history of self-harm, and employ fewer
functional strategies to regulate affect. They were expected to be deficient in cognitive processes
to reduce intense negative affect, engage in less social interaction during these states, and employ
fewer distraction techniques to avert from negative situational stressors. More use of aggression
to decrease intense negative affect was also expected by the self-harm group.
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CHAPTER TWO - PILOT STUDY
It was necessary to review the existing measure of affect intensity, the AIM (Larsen &
Diener, 1987), for use in the present study because it has demonstrated variability in the number
of factors produced (e.g., Weinfurt, Bryant & Yarnold, 1994). The style oflanguage used in the
AIM was also reviewed for its appropriateness with a prison sample. No measures of affect
regulation were found for the present study, so existing coping measures (e.g., the Ways of
Coping Checklist (WCC), Folkman and Lazarus, 1985; the Cybernetic Coping Scale (CCS),
Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) were reviewed as they contain items concerned with decreasing
intense negative affect. These measures, however, include other responses to negative situations
that are not directed towards reducing intense negative affect, nor have they demonstrated
adequate reliability and validity (e.g., See Parker & Endler, 1992).
The first phase of the present research, therefore, involved the development of
appropriate measures of affect intensity and affect regulation for use with a prison sample. This
involved initially restructuring items in the AIM (Larsen & Diener, 1987) to suit the prison
population, and administering this modified version to a small prison sample. Prisoners in this
sample were then asked to elicit strategies that described the methods they used to regulate affect,
and to discuss the utility of various categories of strategies derived from coping (e.g., Folkman
and Lazarus, 1985; Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) and self-harm literature (e.g., Shea, 1993;
Hillbrand et al., 1994). Items in the modified affect intensity measure were then refined and a
checklist of affect regulation strategies constructed. Scales were derived for items in both
measures based on previous research suggesting that affect intensity (Weinfurt et al., 1994) and
affect regulation (Fokman & Lazarus, 1985; Edwards & Baglioni, 1993; Miller, 1992) are multidimensional constructs. The reliability of these scales was assessed using an independent rater.
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Dimensions of Affect Intensity
The assumption that affect intensity is a unidimensional construct and the use of global
AIM scores as a means of assessing affect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987) have been
challenged by Weinfurt et al. (1994). They used confirmatory factor analysis to test two models
of affect intensity, a one dimensional model, as proposed by Larsen and Diener, and a four
dimensional model, as suggested in other research they reviewed. They also used exploratory
principal components analysis to examine a model of best fit. Analyses were conducted on AIM
scores from 673 undergraduate students, and it was found that the data best fitted a four-factor
model. The four factors were positive affectivity (positive affect with high arousal, such as
happiness), negative intensity (negative affect in general, such as sadness, and with high arousal,
such as anxiety), serenity (positive affect with low arousal, such as relaxation) and negative
reactivity (reactions to negative situational stressors, such as sad movies). Chronbach's alpha
levels for the four factors varied between .75 and .90 suggesting adequate to very good internal
consistency in each factor. The inter-correlation between these factors demonstr.ated that they
were relatively unrelated (mean phi co-efficient = .26) suggesting that affect intensity is not a
unidimensional construct. Weinfurt et al. therefore proposed that it is inappropriate to rely on
global AIM scores alone and the use of separate sub-scales in research on affect intensity is
necessary. The present study therefore employed these four factors as sub-scales to undertake a
more valid assessment of affect intensity.

Dimensions of Affect Regulation
Questionnaires that assess coping examine the frequency of various types of responses
made by individuals to stressful situations. Numerous coping questionnaires have sought to
encompass the range of responses enacted (See Parker & Endler, 1992), however, the present
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study required a measure to specifically assess strategies aimed at reducing intense negative
affective states. Although both coping and affect regulation refer to responses that occur to
manage the experiences encountered when negative situations arise, affect regulation focuses on
the utility of strategies employed to reduce elicited intense negative affect. The conceptual
similarities between coping and affect regulation, however, also suggested that an examination of
the types of items and scales included in coping questionnaires might assist the process of
developing a checklist of affect regulation strategies.
Two relevant coping questionnaires that incorporate strategies used to reduce negative
affect are the Ways of Coping Check-list (WCC) (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), and the Cybernetic
Coping Scale (CCS) (Edwards & Baglioni, 1993). The WCC was selected as it has probably
been the most widely used measure in coping research (Parker & Endler, 1992), suggesting that
there is consensus in the field that it provides an acceptable measure with an adequate structure.
The CCS is described as it has a theoretical basis for coping similar to the notion of affect
regulation in that coping concerns the achievement of an optimal state when stress is
experienced. These measures also exemplify functional strategies to reduce stress described by
Miller (1992), such as reinterpreting threatening situations, engaging in activities to divert
attention, seeking information about the source of distress.
The Ways of Coping Checklist (WCC, Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) is based on the theory
that coping involves reducing perceived demands after a threat is detected, then eliciting
responses to this threat. The WCC comprises sixty-six items divided into eight coping behaviour
scales. These scales are confrontive (e.g., I expressed anger to the person(s) who caused the
problem), planful problem-solving (e.g., I made a plan of action ... ), distancing (e.g., Went on as
if nothing had happened), positive reappraisal (e.g., I was inspired to do something creative),
seeking social support (e.g., Talked to someone ... ), escape-avoidance (e.g., Tried to make myself
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feel better by eating, drinking, .... ), accepting responsibility (e.g., Criticised or lectured myself),
and self-controlling (e.g., I tried to keep my feelings to myself). Items are rated on a four-point
scale from 'not used at all' to 'used a great deal'. Although the WCC has been used frequently, it
has not demonstrated stability in its factor structure (Parker & Endler, 1992). Edwards and
Baglioni (1993) also calculated internal reliability estimates on the eight proposed scales using
data from 501 Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students. They found that only one
scale exceeded an alpha level of .70 and that six ranged between .53 and .68, suggesting overall
poor internal consistency within scales.
The Cybernetic Coping Scale (CCS) (Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) was constructed on the
theoretical assumption that coping involves attempts to modify the negative effects of stress by
reducing the discrepancy between an individual's perceived and desired state. This approximates
the concept of affect regulation although most CCS items focus on responses to address stressors,
and not negative affect. It comprises the following five scales: changing the situation (e.g., 'I
tried to fix what was wrong with the situation'), devaluation (e.g., 'I told myself the problem was
unimportant'), avoidance (e.g., 'I tried to forget about the whole thing'), accommodation (e.g., 'I
tried to adapt to th~ situation'), and symptom reduction (e.g., 'I tried to just let off steam'). Items
are assessed according to how coping was achieved in a particular problem-area using a sevenpoint scale ('Did not use at all' to 'Used very much'). Edwards and Baglioni administered the
CCS to 501 MBA students according to how they coped with looking for their ideal job.
Cronbach's alpha calculated for each of the scales suggested that accommodation had a reliability
coefficient of .78 and the remaining scales had coefficients above .86, demonstrating higher
internal consistency within scales compared to the WCC scales. Edwards and Baglioni,
however, cautioned against using this measure in its current form as adequate reliability studies
have not been conducted on a variety of samples.
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Problems with the psychometric properties of these measures suggested that it was
inappropriate to simplify modify existing scales in either the WCC and the CCS to reflect means
of affect regulation for use in the present study. These measures, however, demonstrated that a
diversity of types of items was required to achieve an accurate assessment of affect regulation.
Primarily cognitive strategies were described as a means of approaching the identified stressor.
Both the WCC and the CCS included items that describe problem-solving (in the planful
problem-solving and changing the situation scales, respectively) and attempting to avoid the
situational stressor (in the distancing scale in the WCC and avoidance scale in the CCS). Others
focused on thinking about how to deal with the affective experiences rather than addressing the
situation (self-controlling in the WCC and symptom reduction in the CCS). The WCC also
includes several types of behaviour, such as expressing anger (in the confrontive coping scale),
talking to friends (in the seeking social support scale) and religious activities (positive reappraisal
scale), to cope with negative situational factors.

Face Validity in a Prison Culture
Good face validity of measures in the present study required consideration of the prison
culture to ensure items were relevant and understandable. This issue was particularly important
considering the experience of imprisonment is particularly different from what is generally
experienced in society. Many factors might contribute to this such as the physical environment,
involvement in the criminal justice system, dangers inherent to being imprisoned such as threats
and violence, and personal vulnerability factors such as substance abuse and impulsivity (Toch,
1992). Items in the AIM and questionnaires such as the WCC and the CCS are problematic in
this respect. For example, the AIM was normed on U.S. college students and the vocabulary and
style of language used assumes this educational level. Some of the terms used, such as
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exuberance, euphoria and jubilance, and style of language in items such as 'When someone
compliments me, I get so happy I could 'burst", are unsuited to the prison culture. Coping
questionnaires similarly use abstract concepts and vocabularies that seem inappropriate for the
present study such as 'I let my feelings out somehow' and 'Tried not to bum all my bridges but
leave things open somewhat' in the WCC.

In an attempt to overcome the potential problem of participants not understanding or
identifying with the content of the AIM, items were altered prior to pilot testing on a prison
sample. The style of language and vocabulary were simplified and situations were presented that
were considered more relevant to prisoners. For example, the original item 'Sad movies deeply
touch me' was modified to 'Sad movies get to me'. This modified AIM was administered to a
sample of prisoners so that they could comment on the use of terms and relevance of item
content. The modified AIM was then further refined and a checklist of affect regulation
strategies was constructed on the basis of information provided by the sample of prisoners.
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Method
Participants
Ten male prisoners, five Aboriginal and five Non-Aboriginal, from a West Australian
maximum security prison participated. Ages ranged from eighteen to thirty-five years old. The
prison psychologist, to avoid potential participants feeling coerced to participate if approached by
an individual unfamiliar to them, initially approached prisoners. This process also ensured that
prisoners' files were accessed by existing correctional service employees to retain the anonymity
of participants. The psychologist was also available for referrals if prisoners appeared distressed
during the interview. The psychologist was asked to select prisoners that might be interested in
discussing the measures under investigation, and that did not have a history of self-harm recorded
on their prison or medical files. Prisoners were asked if they were willing to participate in a
research project that involved discussing some questionnaires on emotional reactions so that they
could be improved for use in another study.
Measures
Modified Affect Intensity Measure (AIM(M))
The original AIM consists of items that describe the experience of different emotional
states. A modified version of the AIM (Larsen & Diener, 1987) was constructed based on the
forty original items within the four factors, identified by W einfurt et al. ( 1994), that were used as
sub-scales. This modified AIM (AIM(M)) emulated the types of responses and situations posed
in original items but drew on experiences, situations and terms with which it was expected
prisoners could better identify. The AIM(M) was also designed to avoid repetition of items so
that where several items described similar situations and affective responses in the original
measure, the AIM(M) sought to include only one or two items of each type. Items were modified
if terms considered more suitable for a prison sample could be substituted, or eliminated if no
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feasible alternatives could be generated. Additional items were included that attempted to
capture the features of one of the four factors described by Weinfurt et al ..
The first factor identified by Weinfurt et al. ( 1994) was positive affectivity and
comprised seventeen items in the original AIM reflecting high arousal positive affective
states. Eight of these items described intense positive emotions (e.g., 'When I'm happy
it's a strong type of exuberance') and the other nine items concerned positive reactivity,
or intense positive affective responses to situations. Five of the positive reactivity items
described accomplishments, such as 'When I solve a small personal problem, I feel
euphoric'. Two were concerned with positive situations generally, such as 'When
something good happens, I am usually more jubilant than others'. One item described
anticipating an event, 'My heart races at the anticipation of some exciting event'; and
another concerned sociability, 'I enjoy being with other people very much'.
The original seventeen items in the positive affectivity sub-scale were modified or
discarded for use in the pilot study resulting in a five item sub-scale in the AIM(M). Only one
item described the general experience of positive affect as intense, namely 'When I'm happy, I
feel pepped-up and excited more than calm and content'. The remaining items describing intense
positive states in the original scale were considered inappropriate as terms included, such as
exuberance, euphoria and jubilation, were incongruent with language used within prisons. The
additional four items described positive reactivity. Items described situations similar to those in
the original AIM including accomplishments ('When something happens that makes me look
good, I feel really proud'), positive situations generally ('When things go right, I feel fantastic'),
and anticipating a positive event ('I feel really hyped-up when something exciting is going to
happen'). An additional item included in this sub-scale, not directly based on an original item,
was 'When I feel romantic, it is an intense feeling'.
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The second factor identified by Weinfurt et al. (1994) was negative intensity and
comprised ten items in the original AIM that concerned intense negative affective experiences.
Items included physiological responses (e.g., 'When I am nervous, I get shaky all over'), being
over emotional (e.g., 'My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people'), guilt
(e.g., 'When I feel guilty, this emotion is quite strong'), anxiety (e.g., 'When I do feel anxiety it is
normally very strong'), anger (e.g.' When I get angry it's easy for me to be rational and not
overreact') and negative moods in general (e.g., 'My negative moods are mild in intensity').
Minor modifications to a number of items resulted in a six item negative intensity subscale in the AIM(M). Items concerned experiencing physiological responses ('When I get
nervous, I shake'), being over emotional ('I have feelings that are more intense than most other
people' and 'My friends say I overreact'), anger (When I get angry, I still think straight and don't
freak-out') frustration ('When I get fed-up, I feel really agitated') and negative moods in general
('When I get upset, it's a really strong feeling'). The remaining four items in the original AIM
were considered inappropriate as they described responses that may have created suspicion in
participants. It was anticipated that-if prisoners were awaiting decisions for conditions of early
release, they might have suspected that items describing experiences such as guilt and honesty
were being used to assess remorse for their convictions. These items were therefore not
included.
The third factor identified by Weinfurt et al. (1994) in the original AIM was serenity,
which comprised seven items that described low arousal positive affect, such as being contented,
and relaxed. Five items specifically contrasted intense and serene affect such as 'When I'm
happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than being zestful and aroused', and
two items described accomplishments, such as 'When I succeed at something, my reaction is
calm contentment'.
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Five items were included in the AIM(M) that comprised the serenity sub-scale. These
items also described accomplishments ('I feel quietly satisfied when people tell me I've done
well') and general contentment ('When I'm really happy, I feel relaxed' and 'When I'm in a good
mood, it's a mild feeling'). Items were also included that concerned remaining calm ('I stay calm
even on days where everything goes wrong') and being calm in general ("Cool and calm' could
easily describe me'). Items contrasting positive affect as serene compared to intense were not
included to maintain consistency in style, as these comparisons were not made in other subscales.
The fourth factor identified by Weinfurt et al. (1994) in the original AIM was negative
reactivity which comprised six items that described intense negative affective experiences to
negative situations. Items described a variety of situations such as viewing sad movies ('Sad
movies deeply touch me'), and responding to antisocial behaviour (e.g., 'I feel pretty bad when I
tell a lie') and traumatic situations ('The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me
strongly').
Again, it was considered inappropriate to ask questions related to antisocial behaviour or
traumatic situations to avoid participants believing pro-social responses were being assessed in
relation to their offending. AIM(M) items that comprised the negative reactivity sub-scale
therefore did not include these types of items and resulted in six items concerning negative
situations. The original item 'Sad movies deeply touch me' was modified to 'Sad movies really
get to me'. Alternative situations were devised that concerned being thwarted ('If someone stops
me doing what I want to do, I feel really annoyed'), deceived ('I get really hurt when people I
care about deceive me'), let-down ('When people let me down, I can handle it') and rejected
('Being rejected makes me feel really low'). An item regarding responses to negative situations
in general ('When something bad happens, I feel really down') was also included.
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In the original AIM, participants are required to indicate the frequency with which they

experience the affective states depicted in items on a six-point Likert-type scale from 'Never',
'Almost Never', 'Occasionally', 'Usually', 'Almost Always', to 'Always'. In addition to this
scale, another six-point Likert-type scale was included for prisoners to assess: 'Not at all',
'Hardly ever', 'Occasionally', 'Often', 'Most of the time', and 'All the time'.
The original instructions for the AIM were:
The following questions refer to emotional reactions to typical lifeevents. Please indicate how YOU react to these events by placing a number
from the following scale in the blank space preceding each item. Please base
your answers on how YOU react, not on how you think others react or how
you think a person should react.
These instructions were simplified for use in the pilot study to:
The following statements describe emotional reactions in different situations.
Please tell me whether these statements are true for you NOT AT ALL,
HARDLY EVER, OCCASIONALLY, USUALLY, MOST OF THE TIME or ALL
THE TIME.
Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) Categories
A number of categories of strategies for regulating negative affect were generated to
provide scales for an Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) in the main study. To assess
the validity of these categories, affect regulation strategies generated by participants in the pilot
study were assessed against these categories. Discussion with participants about the types of
strategies each category represented in the pilot study also determined whether prisoners could
identify with each of the categories, despite whether they had elicited those types of strategies.
Categories were based on scales used in coping measures (Parker & Endler, 1992, Folkman &
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Lazarus, 1985, Edwards & Baglioni, 1993), particularly responses associated with regulating
stress (Miller, 1992), and on dysfunctional processes associated with a history of self-harm (e.g.,
Wans tall & Oei, 1989, Shea, 1993). The categories selected for inclusion were cognitive,
distraction, social interaction, and aggression. These categories sought to encompass the most
typical means of regulating affect that would discriminate vulnerability to self-harm. A
definition for each category was derived based on the research literature reviewed for each type
of strategy, and to ensure that categories were mutually exclusive. These definitions were used to
categorise items elicited by participants in the pilot ,study, and to calculate inter-rater reliability
on finalised items for the ARSC.
Cognitive processes were included as a category as previous research has suggested that
individuals self-report problems with cognitive processes prior to an act of self-harm (e.g.,
Wanstall & Oei, 1989) and experience cognitive deficits following a self-harm incident when
intense negative affect is experienced (e.g. Schmidtke & Schaller, 1992; Schotte et al., 1990).
None of these studies, however, have assessed self-reported problems in cognition when intense
negative affective states occur that are not necessarily associated with a self-harm incident.
Moreover, Miller ( 1992) suggested that individuals predisposed to focusing on threatening
aspects of a situation and who did not use strategies, such as reinterpreting their situation,
retained high levels of stress. Numerous scales in both the WCC and the CCS also focus on
various types of cognition. These include problem-solving strategies such as the planful
problem-solving scale in the WCC (e.g., 'Came up with a couple of different solutions to the
problem') and changing the situation scale in the CCS (e.g., 'I tried to change the situation to get
what I wanted'). Other cognitive strategies described avoiding the source of stress, such as
distancing in the WCC (e.g., 'Tried to forget the whole thing'), or minimising the significance of
the stressor, such as devaluation in the CCS (e.g., 'I tried to convince myself that the problem

Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm 35

was not very important after all'). Other scales described attempts at coping with affective states
such as the self-controlling scale in the wee ('I tried to keep my feelings to myself') and the
symptom reduction scale in the ees ('I tried to relieve my tension somehow'). The cognitive
category therefore embraced a diversity of cognitive processes invoked to reduce intense
affective states. Cognition that focussed on stressors, such as active problem-solving and
reinterpreting sources of stress, and cognition that focussed on affective states, such as tolerating
the negative affect (e.g., waiting for the state to subside) and reducing these states (e.g., through
relaxation), were included as strategies. The definition for cognitive strategies was

strategies that require individuals to think about their situation, problem, or feelings in a
way that has the effect of reducing their negative affective state
Distraction was included as a category as Miller (1992) found that the ability to undertake
activities that achieve a shift in attention from threatening situations subsequently decreased
stress in numerous samples, and hence provides an important means of modulating internal
arousal. Individuals predisposed to focusing on sources of stress tended not to undertake these
activities and developed more somatic conditions (Miller, 1992). Although no research reviewed
above on self-harm has focused on these activities, both the wee and the ees contain scales
incorporating items concerned with distraction. Items that describe these types of behaviour are
'Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, using drugs and medication, and
so forth' in the escape-avoidance scale of the wee; and 'I did something I thought would soothe
my nerves' in the symptom reduction scale of the ees. Strategies that divert attention, from the
situation or emotion experienced, to reduce negative affective states incorporate a wide range of
activities such as watching television, reading, and using relaxation techniques. It should be
noted that there is an overlap between distraction strategies and both social interaction and
aggression strategies, which were also included as categories and may function as means of
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distraction. The definition of the distraction category therefore excluded these strategies and
was:

non-aggressive strategies that effectively allow an individual to concentrate on
another activity (that does not primarily focus on social interaction) and hence
avoid/ignore their current state
Social interaction and aggression were included as separate categories as both types of
behaviour have been associated with self-harm. Particular focus on these responses was
therefore important to determine whether prisoners with a history of self-harm could be
discriminated on the basis of social withdrawal or increased use of aggression to regulate affect.
Social interaction was included as a category as previous research has suggested that
individuals with a history of self-harm have deficiencies in socialising. Prior to an act of selfharm, for example, individuals may become socially withdrawn (Wanstall & Oei, 1989). MMPI
results comparing prisoners with a history of self-harm with control prisoners also suggested that
prisoners with a history of self-harm generally experienced more social alienation (Shea, 1993).
This could mean that prisoners vulnerable to self-harm may be less inclined to attempt strategies
that involve interacting socially to decrease intense negative affective states, although no
previous research has explored this specifically. Seeking social support was also included as a
scale in the wee based on factor analytic studies (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) suggesting that
this type of behaviour provides the basis for a separate scale. The social interaction category
therefore concerned socialising as a means of distraction from stressors, or the use of social
resources to assist with sources of distress. The following definition was used for social
interaction:

strategies that refer to an individual initiating behaviour with the purpose
of interacting with other people
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Aggression was included as a category as previous research has demonstrated that
prisoners with a history of self-harm were more likely to act aggressively (Hillbrand et al .. , 1994)
and have impulsive tendencies (Shea, 1993) compared to control prisoners. Libeling ( 1992) also
found that juveniles with a history of self-harm experienced more conflict with other inmates
compared to control participants. Although neither the wee or the ees contain scales that
focus on aggressive behaviour, the wee confrontive scale contains an item that taps into these
behaviours ('I expressed anger to the person(s) who caused the problem') but also describes other
actions that do not involve aggressive behaviour (e.g., 'I did something which I didn't think
would work, but at least I was doing something'). Aggressive behaviour may not have featured
in these measures as they were normed on student samples, so the use of aggressive behaviours
to cope with situations may not have seemed applicable within this context compared to a prison
culture where violence is prevalent (e.g. Toch, 1992). The aggression category therefore sought
to explore whether aggressive strategies were used as a means of affect regulation. Strategies
included a broad range of behaviours including swearing, slamming doors, and hitting objects
and people.
The definition of aggression strategies was:
strategies that refer to verbal or physical acts of aggression.

Procedure
The prison psychologist explained to potential participants that participation was
voluntary and would involve looking at a questionnaire and discussing emotional responses so
the information could be used in another study with other prisoners. Willing participants were
directed, individually or up to three at a time, to an interview room where they were again
informed of the purpose of the study. They were also again told that participation was voluntary
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and could be withdrawn at anytime. They were then asked if they had any queries, and required
to sign an informed consent form if they wished to participate.
Participants were then given printed copies of the AIM(M) and asked to read the
directions. Participants were told they could comment on the measure in general or on individual
items as they completed it. They were asked whether they had any questions before being
requested to complete the AIM(M). Half of the participants were presented with the original
scale and half with the alternative. On completion, they were interviewed regarding their general
impressions of the measure and again asked whether they had any comments on individual items.
They were then presented with the scale they had not used and asked if they had a preference for
the two response scales.
Participants were then asked to list the things that they do to make themselves feel better
when they experience intense negative emotions, such as stress, anger or depression. Participants
were then asked whether they, or other prisoners they knew, engaged in the types of behaviour
represented by the cognitive, distraction, social interaction and aggression categories to reduce
stress, anger, depression, or other negative emotions.
Participants responses were then examined, and AIM(M) sub-scales were refined and the
scales of the ARSC were constructed. An independent rater then categorised items in both
measures. Items for each of the AIM(M) sub-scales were categorised using the following
information from Weinfurt et al.' s (1994) description of the four factors of the AIM: positive
affectivity concerns all positive affective experiences with high arousal, such as happiness, and
includes positive affective responses to positive situations; negative intensity concerns the
experience of negative affect in general, including high arousal, but not in response to negative
situations; serenity concerns positive affect with low arousal, such as relaxation; negative
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reactivity concerns negative affective responses but only to negative situations. Scales for the
ARSC items were categorised using the definitions given in the Measures section above.
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Results
Participants generally found the AIM(M) easy to understand and complete. Feed-back
from responses to AIM(M) items resulted in six items being discarded and an additional six
modified resulting in a sixteen item measure. Participants elicited a range of strategies used to
regulate intense negative affective states that matched cognitive, distraction, social interaction, or
aggression categories. They were also able to identify with these categories, so items were
constructed for the ARSC using these categories. This resulted in a thirty item measure. Interrater reliability measures for the AIM(M) and the ARSC suggested that items in both measures
demonstrated good reliability for each of the sub-scales and scales.
Participants worked through AIM(M) items quickly and said they did not find items
confusing or difficult to understand although several participants made similar comments
regarding the content of some items. On the basis of these comments, and where otherwise
considered appropriate after reviewing the AIM(M), several items were rejected or modified. Of
the five items in the positive affectivity sub-scale, the item 'When I feel romantic, it is an intense
feeling' was discarded as several participants stated that romance could only elicit an intense
feeling, which made the statement seem illogical.
Four of the six items from the negative intensity sub-scale were modified. One item were
considered difficult to rate also because intense responses were perceived as self-evident in the
item 'When I get upset, it's a really strong feeling' which was modified to 'When I feel down, I
get really upset'. A minor modification was made to the item 'When I get fed-up, I feel really
agitated', to 'When I'm fed-up, I feel really agitated' to reflect a more pervasive mood. Several
participants found the item 'My friends say I overreact' from this sub-scale difficult to rate as
they were uncertain what their friends thought so this item was changed to 'I tend to overreact to
things'. 'I have feelings that are more intense than most other peoples' also from the negative
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intensity sub-scale was modified to 'I get stressed-out more than most other people' to focus on
anxiety rather than more potentially confronting affective experiences such as love and hate.
Most participants stated that items describing positive affective states as being typically
mild in the serenity sub-scale ('When I'm in a good mood, it's a mild feeling.' 'When I'm really
happy, I feel relaxed.') were nonsensical because these positive affective experiences were
perceived as quite different from the experience of relaxation and serenity. These items were
subsequently discarded resulting in a three item sub-scale. Of these three items, ''Cool and
calm' could easily describe me' was modified to ''Laid back' could easily describe me' to
eliminate the potential for participants to respond to the image of being 'cool', rather than a
serene experience.
Another three items in the negative reactivity sub-scale ('I get really hurt when people I
care about deceive me'; 'Being rejected makes me feel really low' and 'When something bad
happens I feel really down') were also eliminated, again because they seemed self-evident,
resulting in a three item sub-scale. 'When people let me down I can handle it' from this subscale was also modified to 'People that let me down really get to me' to more clearly describe an
affective experience rather than ability to tolerate rejection. These modifications resulted in a
sixteen item AIM(M) (four items in positive affectivity, six items in negative intensity, three
items in serenity and three items in negative reactivity sub-scales). Seven of the ten participants
also preferred the scale with anchor points from 'not at all' to 'hardly ever' for the AIM(M)
rather than 'never' to 'always'.
An independent rater then catgorised each item into one of the four sub-scales. This
procedure resulted in all sixteen items being correctly categorised. The AIM(M) was therefore
considered to have good inter-rater reliability. Although the number of items in sub-scales was
small, the procedures undertaken to ensure the face validity of items and reliability of sub-scales
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suggested that it was appropriate for use in the main study.
Participants elicited between three and twelve affect regulation strategies that were
matched to one of cognitive, distraction, social interaction or aggression categories based on the
above definitions. Most participants stated that being able to communicate with others within the
prison, on the telephone, or at visits was an important means of reducing negative affective
experiences (social interaction category). Most also listed a number of activities undertaken to
reduce negative affect, particularly sporting activities or watching television (distraction
category). Several responses focused on aggressive strategies such as abusing people or objects.
For three participants, being able to control their emotions with cognitive strategies, such as
focussing on regaining control or avoiding aversive states, were central to their means of affect
regulation. Discussion with participants regarding these categories also revealed that although
not all participants used all types of strategies, they believed that others they knew in the prison
did. Most notably, several participants did not generally use cognitive strategies and most did
not currently use aggression, although they stated that they used aggressive strategies when they
were younger. All elicited responses could be categorised and, because there was consensus on
each category describing affect regulation strategies that were used within a prison population, no
additional categories were considered for the main study.
A thirty item Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) was derived based on
participants' responses and by simplifying items in the WCC and CCS for each of the cognitive,
distraction, social interaction and aggression categories. Eight items comprised cognitive
strategies. These included items that focused on problem-solving ('I try and work out a way to
do something about the problem'), cognitive avoidance ('Instead of worrying, I try to think about
other things'), and reinterpreting situational stressors ('I think about the situation in a different
way so it doesn't seem so bad'). Five items focused on cognitive control of affective experiences
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('I tell myself that there's no use feeling this way'; 'I concentrate on trying to relax'; 'I
concentrate on trying to think clearly'; 'I stop myself before I get intensely stressed or
depressed') and tolerating intense negative affect ('I tell myself to ride it through because it will
pass').
Twelve non-aggressive distraction strategies that did not involve social interaction
comprised the distraction scale. Strategies included leisure activities such as 'I read', 'I do
sporting activities', 'I watch t.v.', 'I use a relaxation technique', and 'I go and do something like
a drawing or a painting'. Two items concerned turning to religious activities ('I read a Bible' and
'I pray') and one concerned working ('I go and work really hard'). The range of activities also
included less active strategies such as 'I cry', 'I go somewhere to be alone', and substance use ('I
get drunk' and 'I take other drugs').
The social interaction scale comprised four items. Two items concerned using social
interaction as a means of distraction which were 'I try and joke around with my friends' and 'I do
other things with my friends'. The remaining two items concerned engaging social interaction to
assist in the source of stress and we~e 'I try and get someone else to help me do something about
the problem' and 'I talk to friends about my problems'.
Six items were included in the aggression scale. Three of these described strategies
directed at objects ('I slam doors'; 'I take it out on my belongings'; 'I throw things'). The
remaining three described aggressive actions that were directed towards others ('I verbally abuse
other people'; 'I hit other people'; 'I yell',).
An independent rater was asked to categorise items in the ARSC using the above
definitions and there was disagreement on only one item suggesting good reliability for
items in each of the scales. The only item not categorised correctly was 'I concentrate on
trying to relax' from the cognitive category, which was classified by the independent rater
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as a distraction strategy. The term 'concentrate', however, suggested that this item
focused on cognitive processing, hence it was retained in the cognitive scale.
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CHAPTER THREE - THE MAIN STUDY
Method
Participants
Two samples of male prisoners, a self-harm group and a control group, were
selected from two maximum security prisons in Western Australia. To preserve
prisoners' privacy by limiting file access to existing correctional employees and retaining
prisoners' anonymity, potential participants were selected by the prisons' psychologists
based on their knowledge of prisoners and cross-checking information on files.
Psychologists involved in selection were also available for referrals if participants
appeared distressed during the interview.
Psychologists approached every prisoner who met the criteria for the self-harm
group over a two and a half-month period. Prisoners for the self-harm group were
required to have committed at least two acts of self-harm while in prison or in the
community (the most recent act within a year), but to be assessed as not currently at risk
of self-harm. This was to minimise the risk of prisoners being coerced into participating
by virtue of their vulnerable state. Self-harm was defined as the act of intentionally
inflicting harm on oneself resulting in injuries that require medical attention. Self-report
was used to determine whether these acts were intentional rather than accidental through·
interviews by the prison psychologists, although at times that were not connected to the
present study. Suicidal intent was not considered as this information is variably available
in prison records and the purpose of the current study was to examine individual
difference characteristics in prisoners vulnerable to self-harm regardless of intent. The
prison psychologist was asked to select matched participants for the control group who
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did not have a known history of self-harm. Control prisoners were matched with selfharm prisoners according to prison, race (Aboriginal Australian, or not), and age. Age
was matched by finding a prisoner on the muster with a date of birth as close as possible
to that of the self-harm prisoners'.
Forty prisoners, twenty in each group, participated. Fifteen from each group were
tested in one prison and five from each group were tested in the other. Seven from each
group were identified as Australian Aboriginal and thirteen as Non-Aboriginal. Age was
calculated for each prisoner in years and months. The mean age for the self-harm group
was 24 years (SD=3.37) and the mean age for the control group was 24.1 years
(SD=3.85). No additional information regarding prisoners who participated was sought
to respect the confidentiality of the information on prisoners' files.

Measures
Modified Affect Intensity Measure (AIM(M))
The final version of the AIM(M) comprised sixteen items that assessed four
dimensions of affect intensity, as described in the pilot study in Chapter Two. Four items
assessed positive affectivity (all positive affective experiences with high arousal), six
items assessed negative intensity (general negative affective experiences, including those
with high arousal), three items assessed serenity (positive affective experiences with low
arousal) and three items assessed negative reactivity (intense negative affective
experiences to situational stressors). Each item described a common affective experience
and participants were required to rate how often they typically experienced this reaction
on a frequency scale. The frequency scale was a six-point Likert-type scale, each which
had corresponding label and numerical values: 'not at all' (0), 'hardly ever' (1),
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'occasionally' (2), 'often' (3), 'most of the time' (4) and 'all the time' (5). Each of the
scale labels and their corresponding numbers were printed across a white A4 page.
Verbal instructions given to participants when the scale was first presented were:
For the first part of this interview I'm going to read some statements to
you and ask you to use this scale to answer them. Have you used a scale
like this before? .... This scale allows you to choose how often you
experience what's described in the statements; you can select from 'not
at all' to 'all the time'. The following statements describe emotional
reactions to different situations. Please tell me whether these statements
are generally true for you not at all, hardly ever, occasionally, usually,
most of the time, or all the time. You can use either the words or the
numbers in the scale to answer the statements. Do you understand?
After re-coding reverse worded items and averaging across items, the
possible range of scores for each of the sub-scales was O - 5 with high scores
corresponding to the frequent experience of: (a) positive affect with high arousal
(positive affectivity); (b) intense negative affect in general, including high
arousal (negative affectivity); (c) a lack of positive affect with low arousal (lack
of serenity, with low scores corresponding to the frequent experience of low
arousal positive states such as relaxation); and (d) intense negative affective
responses to situational stressors (negative reactivity).

Global Affect Intensity Measure
A global affect intensity measure was also administered as an overall measure of
affect intensity and as a validity check for the AIM(M). It required participants to self-
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assess their emotional responsiveness in general. Responses were made on a scale from
'Mildly', which had a value of 1, to 'Intensely', which had a value of 10. These anchors
and the numbers from 1 to 10 were printed across a white A4 page, and no other numbers
were assigned labels. Responses were participants' global affect intensity scores.
Instructions given to participants were
On a scale from one to ten, do you think you're a person who reacts
intensely to things, or do you have fairly mild reactions?
Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC)
The final version of the ARSC comprised thirty affect regulation strategies. These
strategies described processes by which participants might decrease intense negative
affective states. Strategies were rated against the frequency scale used in the
administration of the AIM(M) and an effectiveness scale. The effectiveness scale was a
six-point Likert-type scale with indicators of 'useless' (0), 'not much good' (1), 'fair' (2),
'good' (3), 'very good' (4), to 'excellent' (5). Each of the scale labels for this scale, and
their corresponding numbers, were also printed across a white A4 page.
Participants were given the following instructions:
The following statements describe things you might do to make yourself
feel better when you feel bad, like being depressed, stressed or angry.
First state how often you use each technique with the scale that you used
earlier: not at all, hardly ever, occasionally, usually, most of the time, or
all the time. Again, you can use either the words or the numbers in the
scale. Then state how good each technique is at making you feel better
using this other scale: useless, not much good, fair, good, very good or
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excellent. Again, you can use either the words or the numbers in the
scale. Do you understand?
As described in Chapter 2, the thirty items in the ARSC comprised four
categories: cognitive, distraction, social interaction and aggression. Eight items referred
to cognitive strategies, defined as strategies that require an individual to think about their
situation, problem or feelings in a way that has the effect of reducing their negative
affective state (e.g., 'I tell myself there's no use feeling this way'). These items focused
on cognitive processes to reduce the intense affective response either by promoting
relaxation, reframing the problem, diverting attention from the situation, or problemsolving. Twelve items described an array of distraction techniques, defined as nonaggressive strategies that effectively allow an individual to concentrate on another activity
(other than those primarily involving social interaction), and hence avoid or ignore the
aversive nature of their current state. These items described behaviour ranging from
watching television, participating in sporting activities, or reading, through to taking
drugs or alcohol, and engaging in religious activities such as praying. Four items referred
to social interaction, defined as strategies that require an individual initiating behaviour
with the purpose of interacting with other people (e.g., 'I try and joke around with my
friends'). Additional interaction items encompassed other activities undertaken with
friends and also seeking help from people. Six items referred to aggressive strategies
defined as strategies that describe verbal or physical acts of aggression. Aggressive
strategies included verbal abuse, yelling and hitting people, and throwing objects (e.g., 'I
take it out on my belongings'). Scores for each of the scales were obtained by calculating
the product of the frequency and effectiveness scale scores, then taking the mean of these
scores for items in each scale.
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Procedure
Prisoners selected by the prison psychologist were invited to participate
voluntarily in a university study on how people experience emotions and react to stressful
situations. Prisoners were individually directed to an interview room where the purpose
of the study was reiterated and they were informed that participation involved an
interview that would take about fifteen minutes. They were again informed that
participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw at any time, and that individual
responses would not be made available to prison administrators, or used in reports about
the study. Prisoners were then asked if they had any queries and required to sign an
informed consent form.
In each interview both measures of affect intensity, the AIM(M) and the global
affect intensity measure, and the ARSC were administered. Instructions were given
verbally and responses were recorded on answer sheets. Participants were first presented
with the frequency scale and given the instructions to the AIM(M). AIM(M) items were
then read to participants who rated each consecutively according to how frequently they
had that experience in the situation described. On completion of the AIM(M),
participants were presented with the global affect intensity scale and asked to rate their
overall affect intensity between 1 and 10. Participants were then given the instructions to
the ARSC. After each item was read to participants, they rated the strategy according to
how often it was used when intense negative affect was experienced. If the strategy was
used, its effectiveness at reducing intense negative affective states was then rated before
the next item was presented. All thirty items were administered.
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Results
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. Two-tailed tests of
significance were used for all t-tests. Although directional hypotheses were being tested,
they were not so strongly supported by theory as to justify the use of one-tailed tests.
Affect Intensity Measures
The two measures of affect intensity were the sixteen item AIM(M), that had a
Cronbach' s alpha level of .80, and the single item global affect intensity score.
Participants mean AIM(M) scores for the four affect intensity sub-scales, positive
affectivity, negative intensity, lack of serenity, and negative reactivity, were calculated by
reverse-coding items that did not describe intense affective states. High scores on the
sub-scales therefore corresponded to experiences of intense affective states or lack of
serenity. Correlations between the four sub-scales are shown in Table 1. The positive
affectivity
sub-scale did not significantly correlate with any of the other sub-scales suggesting that
the experience of intense positive affect is not associated with other types of affective
experiences. Negative intensity and negative reactivity sub-scales were significantly
correlated Cr (38) = .56, Q = .01) so the experience of intense negative affect in general
was associated with the intensity of responses to situational stressors. Although the lack
of serenity sub-scale was not correlated with negative reactivity, it was significantly
correlated with negative intensity (r (38)

= .55, Q = .01).

A lack of serenity and relaxation

was associated with the experience of intense negative affective states in general, but was
not associated with responses to situational stressors.
Mean scores for AIM(M) affect intensity sub-scales for both groups are shown in
Table 2. The self-harm group had a higher affect intensity score overall ( M = 2.97, SD
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= .64) than the control group (M = 2.08, SD= .44). Table 2 also shows that the selfharm group rated their affective experiences and lack of serenity higher than the control
group

Table 1
Intercorrelations Between Mean Scores for Positive Affectivity, Negative Intensity, (lack
of) Serenity and Negative Reactivity Sub-scales of the AIM(M) (N = 40).

Sub-scale

Positive
affectivity
(4 items)
Negative
intensity
(6 items)

Positive
affectivity

Negative
intensity

(Lack of)
Serenity

Negative
reactivity

.11

-.19

.12

.55**

.56**

(Lack of)
Serenity
(3 items)

.15

Negative
reactivity
(3 items)
Note. ** .Q = .01

on each of the affect intensity sub-scales. Scores were compared in a 4 x 2 mixed
factorial design with affect intensity sub-scales (positive affectivity, negative intensity,
serenity and negative reactivity) as the within subjects factor and group (self-harm and
control) as the between subjects factor. This analysis revealed significant main effects for
both the affect intensity sub-scales, E._(3, 76) = 33.44, .Q < .001, and group, E (1, 38) =
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22.23, n < .001. The interaction between affect and group was also significant, f (3, 76)
= 5.64, n = .003.

Four t-tests for independent samples were conducted to examine

the interaction. These t-tests showed that while there was no significant difference
between groups for

Table 2
Mean Scores for Positive Affectivity, Negative Intensity, Serenity, and Negative
Reactivity Sub-scales in the AIM(M) for Self-harm and Control Groups.
Self-harm
(n = 20)
M
SD

M

SD

Positive affectivity
(4 items)

3.43

0.94

3.39

0.76

Negative reactivity
(3 items)

3.28

1.10

2.60

1.15

Negative intensity
(6 items)

2.88

0.96

1.33

0.59

(Lack of) Serenity
(3 items)
Total
Note. Possible range= 0 - 5.

2.21

0.90

1.30

0.56

2.97

0.64

2.08

0.44

Sub-scales

Control
(!! = 20)

ratings of intense positive affect,! (38) = 0.16, n = .87, the self-harm group, compared to
the control group, scored higher on lack of serenity,! (38) = 3.82, n = 001, and negative
intensity,! (38) = 6.14, n = .000. There was also a trend for the self-harm group to rate
items in the negative reactivity sub-scale higher compared to the control group, !(38) =
1.92, n = .063.
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Global affect intensity scores were also rated significantly higher by the self-harm
group (M = 7.38, SD=2.21) compared to the control group (M = 4.45, SD=l.29), !._(30.59)
= 5.12, Q < .001. However, the Levene's test also indicated greater variance in the selfharm group than in the control group (f = 8.12, Q = .007). Thirteen participants in the
self-harm group rated their overall level of affect intensity above 6, although none of the
control group rated themselves above this score. As expected, overall AIM(M) scores
and global affect intensity scores were significantly positively correlated (r..(38) = .78, Q =
.00) supporting the validity of the AIM(M) as a measure of overall emotional
responsiveness.
Affect Regulation Strategies
Participants rated items on the ARSC in terms of the frequency with which
strategies were utilised and the effectiveness of each strategy in decreasing negative
affective states. The correlation between participants' mean frequency (M = 2.05, SD=
.61) and mean effectiveness (M = 1.89, SD= .61) scores across the 30 ARSC items was
.84 (Q < .001). Due to the high correlation between these two ratings, analysis of ARSC
items was conducted using the product scores of frequency by effectiveness ratings for
each strategy to produce scores that reflect the overall utility of strategies for participants.
These scores were summed and divided by 30 to produce an average ARSC score for
each participant with a possible range between O and 25. At-test for independent
samples was then conducted on average ARSC scores which showed no significant
difference between the self-harm group (M = 5.97, SD= 2.63) and the control group (M
= 6.83, SD= 2 69), ! (38) = 1.03, Q = .31. However, comparing participants' total scores
may have obscured differences between groups in the types of strategies utilised.
Additional analyses were, therefore, conducted surnrning across items.
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Examination of group means for individual items showed a different pattern for
the self-harm group compared to the control group. The latter had relatively high scores
for some items and low scores for others, whereas the self-harm group tended to have
more moderate scores for all items. Using item mean scores as 'case scores' in a
Levene's test showed a significant difference in the variance among items for the two
groups, E = 35.44, n < .001. As can be seen in Table 3, the mean ratings of items for the
control group ranged from 0.25 to 15.70 compared to the self-harm group, that had a
narrower range, from 1.70 (for 'I read a Bible') to 9.60 (for 'I take other drugs'). The
self-harm group tended to rate all strategies more uniformly whereas the control group
rated some items quite high and others hardly at all. T-tests for independent samples
were calculated, as an exploratory analysis, to compare groups' ratings on each of the
thirty items. Table 3 shows that the control group rated undertaking sporting activities
and five cognitive strategies (e.g., 'I concentrate on trying to relax'; 'I concentrate on
trying to think clearly'; 'I tell myself that there's no use feeling this way'; 'I tell myself to
ride it through because it will pass';, 'I think about the situation in a different way so it
doesn't seem so bad') significantly higher than the self-harm group. The self-harm group
rated two items from the aggression category significantly higher than the control group.
These were to use verbal abuse and throw things.
Strategies were categorised, as described in the pilot study, into four scales:
cognitive, distraction, social interaction, and aggression. Scales were devised on a
theoretical basis, not factor analytic studies, so Chronbach's alpha was calculated for each
to assess the reliability of scales. Poor internal consistency was found for the four items
describing social interaction strategies (Chronbach's alpha= .43) and the twelve items
describing distraction items (Chronbach's alpha= .64). However, high internal

Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm 56

Table 3
Mean Scores of ARSC Items and t-values for the Self-harm and Control Group (Arranged
in Rank Order for the Control Group}.
Control
Self -harm
!-value
(N =20)
(N =20)
M
SD
Item
M
SD
Sport
15.70
7.66
3.45**
7.48
7.44
Try to relax
12.25
7.42
2.40*
6.75
7.05
Joke with friends
12.25
7.72
1.79
7.70
8.33
Work hard
0.93
11.65
7.44
9.42
7.69
Try to think clearly
8.31
2.53*
11.40
5.95
4.85
Problem-solve
10.95
6.97
1.96
6.80
6.39
Do things with friends
10.55
6.37
1.97
6.55
6.50
Be alone
0.80
7.67
6.85
10.05
8.20
6.18
1.65
10.00
6.80
6.11
Watch t.v.
Say 'ride it through'
9.75
8.67
3.22**
2.90
3.91
Think about other things
6.37
0.92
9.65
7.75
6.71
Think of prob. differently
9.60
6.56
5.85
4.80
2.34*
Relaxation technique
9.40
9.46
1.71
5.15
5.90
Say 'no use feeling this way'
5.74
2.45*
9.10
4.68
5.70
Take drugs
8.50
10.49
9.60
9.50
0.35
Stop getting stressed
7.70
6.37
0.80
6.15
5.88
Read
6.20
7.86
3.85
5.76
1.08
Get drunk
5.35
6.23
0.87
7.85
10.07
Talk about problems
4.40
5.20
0.50
5.45
7.80
5.43
Yell
3.45
1.53
6.90
8.53
Pray
3.10
6.54
0.68
1.90
4.44
Draw/paint
2.60
4.86
5.85
7.70
1.60
Get someone to help
2.35
2.35
4.10
4.15
1.64
Read Bible
1.85
4.61
0.11
1.70
4.17
1.80
2.19
9.28
2.39*
Verbal abuse
6.90
1.86
Cry
1.65
3.91
4.15
4.58
Slam doors
2.37
1.88
1.60
5.22
8.30
1.60
2.05
1.15
3.59
5.06
Hit people
0.70
2.25
6.95
1.77
Take it out on belongings
3.60
Throw things
0.25
0.55
4.20
7.19
2.45*
TOTAL
1.21
6.83
4.40
5.76
2.01
Note: Possible range of mean scores is O - 25, !-test values compare self-harm and control
groups, * 12 < .05 ** 12 < .01.
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consistency was found for the eight items describing cognitive strategies (Chronbach's
alpha= .86) and the six describing aggressive strategies (Chronbach's alpha= .87). Scale
scores for the latter two categories were compared between groups. At-test for
independent samples indicated that the control group rated cognitive strategies as
significantly higher (M=l0.05, SD=4.86) than the self-harm group (M=5.79, SD=3.78), !
(38)=3.10, Q = .004. Results were reversed for aggression strategies in that the self-harm
group (M = 5.07, SD= 6.04) rated these strategies higher than the control group (M =
1.49, SD= 1.42). The t-test for independent samples adjusted for unequal variances was
significant,! (21.1) = 2.58, Q_= .02. The Levene's test showed that there was greater
variability in the self-harm group's ratings of aggression items,!:= 16.68, Q < .001.
Whereas for the control group the highest mean score for the six aggression items was
five, scores for nine of the participants in the self-harm group ranged between five and
eighteen.
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Discussion
The results from both measures of affect intensity, the AIM(M) and the global
affect intensity scores, supported the hypothesis that prisoners with a history of self-harm
generally experience more intense emotional responsiveness than their counterparts who
have not engaged in self-harm. However, while prisoners with a history of self-harm had
significantly higher scores on negative intensity and lack of serenity, and demonstrated a
tendency for situational stressors to elicit more intense negative affect, the two groups did
not differ in positive affectivity on the AIM(M). This suggests that intense experiences of
negative affect and less serene experiences are pervasive in prisoners who have a history
of self-harm compared to other prisoners, although these experiences are not coupled with
significantly more intense experiences of positive affect. This also suggests that prisoners
with a history of self-harm not only experience negative affect more intensely, but would
tend to react emotionally more frequently and be more susceptible to physiological
arousal compared to other prisoners (Larsen et al., 1986). The results of the present study
therefore suggest that prisoners with a history of self-harm experience emotional !ability
as they respond to more life events with more intense negative affective experiences, with
infrequent overall experiences of serenity and calmness. These results are consistent with
Shea's (1993) research that compared MMPI scores from forensic patients who had
engaged in self-harm with MMPI scores from control prisoners. The self-harm group
scored higher on scales that indicated they experienced more feelings of distress and
alienation, reflecting erratic emotional experiences.
An important implication of the results of the present study is that they provide a
context for the interpretation of previous research. Individuals prone to self-harm appear
to be also prone to experience intense negative affect that may reach intolerable levels in
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response to particular stressors, thereby precipitating acts of self-harm. This is consistent
with the conclusions drawn by Pattison and Kahan (1993). This high affect intensity can
remain a salient factor, even though previous research has shown that intense affective
levels decrease following an incident (e.g., Schmidtke & Shaller,1992; Schotte et al.,
1990). Schmidtke and Schaller (1992), for example, found that state measures of
depression, hopelessness, and anxiety in participants who had attempted suicide
decreased significantly, and were equal in intensity to their control group, several weeks
following the attempted suicide. The present study suggests, however, that these
individuals may none-the-less have a propensity to experience intense negative affect thus
increasing the likelihood of future self-harm incidents.
Individuals who experience high negative affect intensity should also experience
acute and agitated affect if frequent situational stressors occur, resulting in less subjective
well-being compared to individuals who do not experience high negative affect intensity
(Larsen & Diener, 1987). Ivanoff and Jang (1991) demonstrated an association between
negative situations, high levels of negative emotional states, and suicidal behaviour.
They found that suicidal ideation and preoccupation with self-harm were mediated by
previous and current situational stressors, such as a history of juvenile incarceration and
having a long prison sentence imposed. These negative situations increased state levels of
depression and hopelessness, that in tum affected suicidal factors. Although they
suggested social desirability interacted with hopelessness to increase suicidal behaviour,
the cognitive processes involved in social desirability were not clearly defined. Ivanoff
and Jang' s study highlighted the complex relationship between stressors, emotional
experiences, and self-harm. However, the present study has examined whether affect
intensity is a pervasive characteristic indicative of vulnerability to self-harm that has
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greater utility than assessing social desirability. It might be, however, that a propensity to
experience intense negative affect and less relaxation manifests itself in less efficient
cognitive functioning overall, although this was not specifically assessed in the present
study.
An additional factor that would seem to impinge on subjective well-being,
however, concerns the use of effective affect regulation strategies. Results from the
present study suggested that prisoners with a history of self-harm not only experience
negative affective states more intensely, but responses to the ARSC demonstrated that
they engaged in less efficient means of reducing intense negative affective states.
Prisoners with no history of self-harm rated only some strategies on the ARSC quite high,

..

!

such as engaging in sporting activities and trying to relax, suggesting that these prisoners
tend to use a limited number of strategies, albeit efficiently. Prisoners with a history of
self-harm, however, reported using a greater variety of strategies that had overall less
utility compared to the control group. It seems that the self-harm group tended to attempt
a variety of strategies but none were particularly useful. So, although intense negative
affect associated with self-harm incidents decreases to normal levels in a matter of time,
individuals vulnerable to self-harm appear to be less well equipped to deal with intense
emotional states in a functional manner. This might be why self-harm becomes an option
to decrease these aversive states, but might also be indicative of an overall pattern of
harmful strategies used to reduce intense negative affect. This supposition is supported
by previous research that has demonstrated factors symptomatic of poor subjective well
being are prevalent in samples with a history of self-harm. Liebling (1992), for example,
found that a reported history of drug and alcohol problems and psychiatric disorder were
more prevalent among juveniles with a history of self-harm than among control group
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prisoners. Further to this, drug and alcohol problems and psychiatric disorder have also
been associated with completed prison suicides (e.g. Dooley, 1990) suggesting that
symptoms indicative of poor subjective well being, perhaps also as a result of ineffective
affect regulation, might be pervasive in suicidal processes generally.
Intense negative emotional responses are associated with cognitive processes that
include overgeneralisation and personalisation in response to emotion eliciting stimuli
(Larsen et al., 1987). These processes focus on the nature of the stimuli and are
congruent with cognitive processes that occur prior to self-harm incidents (Pattison &
Kahan, 1993), that involve an inability to divert attention from the negative situation and
a desire to self-harm. This is also perhaps why prisoners who self-harm have been found
to be more impulsive (Shea, 1993) in that intense affective states affect concentration and
limit the ability to deliberate (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Previous research has further
demonstrated that intense negative affective states in individuals who self-harm are also
associated with poor interpersonal problem-solving skills (Schotte et al., 1990), rigid
thinking, and field dependence (e.g.,. Scmidtke & Schaller, 1992). Focussing and
elaborating on the emotive nature of stimuli might be more likely to occur in prisoners
vulnerable to self-harm, rather than cognitive processes that are functional for regulating
stress, such as reinterpreting or avoiding stressors that must be tolerated, or devising
strategies to change the situation (Miller, 1992).
The pattern of regulating intense negative affect reported by prisoners in the
present study also provides greater insight into previous research that has suggested
prisoners who self-harm have problems coping. Toch ( 1992), for example, asserted that
an ability to harness stress differentiated prisoners who had not engaged in self-harm and
attempted suicide. Survival within prison was determined by ability to engage strategies
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such as utilising supports, taking a detached stance, and shutting off negative affect. The
present study, however, suggests that the more critical skills involve strategies that utilise
cognitive processes to facilitate a reduction in intense negative affective states.
Liebling's (1992) notion that poor problem-solving ability in response to negative
situations propels prisoners into self-harm is also supported in the present study. It seems
that once intense negative affect is experienced, prisoners who self-harm are limited in
efficiently reducing negative affect, although a range of cognitive skills may be affected
in addition to problem-solving. Strategies in the cognitive scale in the present study
included focusing on reducing the affective state, tolerating the affective state, or
reinterpreting or avoiding the stressor, as well as problem-solving, to reduce intense
negative affect.
The present study has not determined whether the apparent deficiency in cognitive
strategies in the self-harm sample is a result of the intensity of the negative affect
experienced. A more intense experience may preclude cognitive strategies being
engaged. Alternatively, when intense negative affect is experienced equally by both
groups, those with a history of self-harm may not use cognitive strategies, perhaps
because other strategies have been reinforced previously. It may even be that not using
cognitive strategies results in a higher intensity of affect. Previous studies that have
identified problems in cognition in individuals with active suicidal processes (e.g.,
Schotte et al., 1990; Schmidtke & Schaller, 1992), have not compared performance with
control groups exhibiting equal levels of negative affect. Whether intense negative affect
inhibits cognitive processes, or prisoners who self-harm have differences in their
motivation or ability to use these strategies, is therefore worthy of further investigation. It
might also be the case that when negative affect is at a very intense level, cognitive
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processes are inhibited, but prisoners who do not self-harm are able to engage in
functional activities. Most notably from the present study was the much higher rating of
sporting activities by the control group as a means of decreasing negative affect.
The present study also revealed that there is a tendency for some prisoners with a
history of self-harm to also engage in aggressive strategies to reduce intense negative
affect compared to those with no history of self-harm. These results are consistent with
previous research suggesting that individuals who self-harm were likely to engage in
more acts of aggression directed towards objects and people (e.g., Hillbrand et al., 1994).
However, results from the present study further suggest that these behaviours are
functional for some prisoners who self-harm in that they effectively reduce intense
negative affective states. Although this response was not uniform in the self-harm group,
an important concern regarding this finding is that the use of aggressive strategies is
likely to result in an increase in negative situational factors with adverse consequences,
such as retaliation and punishment. These situations are likely to increase the number of
intense negative affective experiences encountered, thereby decreasing subjective well
being, and increasing the likelihood of future self-harm incidents. In this respect, it is not
surprising that once individuals engage in self-harm, a pattern of multiple incidents is
frequently initiated (e.g., Hillbrand et al., 1994; Morgan et al., 1976; Wanstall & Oei,
1989).
Results of the present study are consistent with previous reported psychological
experiences associated with self-harm incidents (e.g., Pattison & Kahan, 1993: Wanstall

& Oei, 1989), that include intense negative affective states experienced in conjunction
with cognitive constriction, or an inability to cogitate on matters other than sources of
distress and/or self-harm. The present study suggests that when prisoners with a history
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of self-harm experience intense negative affect, cognitive strategies are less likely to be
utilised to reduce this aversive state compared to those with no history of self-harm. This
tendency to not use functional cognitive strategies appears to be pervasive and not
restricted to those incidents involving acts of self-harm.
These results support a transactional theory of self-harm that assumes that several
factors related to a person's experiences and style of behaviour, in conjunction with
environmental factors, determine risk of suicidal behaviour (Schmidtke & Schaller,
1992). A modification of the transactional theory tested by Schmidtke and Schaller is
proposed in light of the present study. Schmidtke and Schaller' s research did not support
the assumption that individuals vulnerable to suicidal behaviour were predisposed to
perceive the world as undifferentiated and inarticulated, so when situational factors
elicited negative affect the probability of suicidal behaviours increased. While problems
in cognitive functioning were evident when negative affective states were intense, these
dysfunctional processes were not present when affective states returned to normal levels.
However, the results of the present study suggest that vulnerability to self-harm is
associated with a predisposition to experience high negative affect intensity. It might be
that it is the intensity of the negative affect that causes dysfunctional cognition when it
occurs. Self-harm behaviour might develop through a learning process in which selfharm incidents are reinforced by positive consequences such as relief and attention from
others when intense negative affective states are experienced. Further exploration is
required, however, to investigate the relationship between cognitive processing when
intense negative affect is experienced and self-destructive behaviour. Although intense
emotional experiences are associated with elaboration of the emotional stimuli (Larsen et
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al., 1987), the additional factors that play a role in the development of self-destructive
behaviour from this experience are not clear.

Assessment, Intervention and Management Implications
The assessment of affect intensity and affect regulation might be useful for
identifying individuals vulnerable to self-harm acts. To reduce the incidence of self-harm
and suicide in custodial settings, this study suggests the employment of interventions and
management strategies that specifically target prisoners assessed as high in negative affect
intensity and with inefficient affect regulation. Administration of the AIM(M) and the
ARSC are measures that might effectively detect prisoners vulnerable to self-harm.

However, pending further research, these measures should be considered provisional.
While the present study suggests that affect intensity may be a useful factor in
assessing risk of suicidal behaviour, it has failed to find that affect intensity is a unidimensional construct as proposed by Larsen and Diener (1987). Differences were found
between the self-harm and control groups in their level of affect intensity for negative
intensity and serenity but not positive affectivity and, accordingly, affect intensity as a
construct requires further investigation. It could be that various other factors concerned
with affect are more pertinent with respect to vulnerability to self-harm. One difficulty in
the measurement of affect intensity, for example, concerns a possible confound between
frequency and intensity. Measurement required the assessment of the frequency of
intense affective experiences, hence being exposed to frequent negative experiences may
have inadvertently affected individuals affect intensity score.
A prospective study of the predictive power and psychometric properties of these
measures is required to confirm the structure of the AIM(M) and the ARSC using factor
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analysis. While there is no particular reason to suspect that differences found between
groups were the result of biases in sampling, additional research on the ability of these
measures to correctly classify vulnerability in a larger sample of prisoners is desirable.
The ARSC in particular would benefit from reviewing its structure. Although the present
study failed to find the distraction and social interaction scales reliable, it could be that
the multi-dimensional nature of these behaviours requires more detailed assessment.
Social interaction in particular would seem to be important to continue investigating, as
social withdrawal has been associated with self-harm behaviour (e.g., Wanstall & Oei,
1989).
Assessments conducted to identify prisoners vulnerable to self-harm should also
include criminological and other demographic factors, such as the type of offence and
sentencing, which might impact on an individual's subjective well-being, that is also
determined by their level of affect intensity. These factors are pertinent to assess acute
risk, as demonstrated by Ivanoff and Jang's (1991) research that suggested that current
suicidal tendencies were mediated by various criminological experiences and their impact
on hopelessness and depression. Prospective research, therefore, is required using a
number of predictive factors to assess the ability of the measures in the present study to
correctly classify prisoners who engage in suicidal behaviour. Classification analysis,
such as logistical regression or discriminant function analysis, is required with
classification tables to assess the overall accuracy of the AIM(M) and the ARSC in
identifying prisoners who engage in suicidal behaviour, and to ascertain the nature of any
misclassification. Given the gravity of the consequences, the measures will have little
utility if misclassification occurs for individuals who engage in suicidal behaviour,
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compared to the categorisation of individuals as 'at risk' who do not engage in suicidal
behaviour.
The association between the experience of intense negative affective states and
subsequent acts of self-harm, or other dysfunctional behaviour, can be addressed in
clinical interventions by replacing the undesirable behaviour with an alternative
behaviour that reduces this aversive state (e.g., Shearin & Linehan, 1994). Prisoners who
self-harm might experience characteristically intense negative emotional responsiveness
and less experience of serenity because of a physiological predisposition to under-arousal.
The experience of intense emotional responsiveness therefore facilitates the achievement
of arousal at base-line levels (Larsen & Diener, 1987). However, self-harm might have
emerged through learning (e.g., Wanstall & Oei, 1989) as a means of attaining positive
consequences to experiences of intense negative affect. Self-harm behaviour, however,
might be replaced with other behaviour to regulate negative affect or achieve other
desired consequences. In particular, the development of cognitive skills, anger
management techniques, and promoting a repertoire of behaviours that reduce intense
negative affect should reduce the incidence of self-harm. Results from the present study
suggest, however, that an extensive repertoire of strategies to regulate affect is not crucial,
but that a number of efficient strategies are required.
The present study suggests that it may be useful to educate staff who manage
prisoners about affect intensity and the tendency of prisoners with a history of self-harm
to experience intense negative affect and less serene, calm states. This knowledge might
be useful for anticipating incidents of self-harm. Prisoners with high affect intensity
might perceive events as more dramatic than others would expect them to, although it
might not simply be during the initial reaction when management strategies are required.
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Pervasive negative affective states surrounding stressors are experienced more intensely
by prisoners with a history of self-harm compared to other prisoners, and might play an
integral role in precipitating self-harm incidents. Furthermore, prisoners vulnerable to
self-harm may become more easily aroused and experience more mood variability (Larsen
et al., 1986). This suggests that appropriate support provided to vulnerable prisoners
when intense negative affective states are observed, particularly as their repertoire of
functional affect regulation strategies may be limited, may reduce incidents. Staff also
need to be aware that aggressive behaviour might be used by vulnerable prisoners as a
means of regulating negative affect, so training in conflict resolution strategies might
facilitate management.
Results of the present study also suggest that when prisoners who are at risk of
self-harm have limited or no access to activities that regulate affect, such as when placed
in solitary confinement, they might not have the ability to reduce intense negative affect,
thus increasing the probability of a self-harm incident. This phenomenon was described
by Bach-y-Rita (1974) who observed that in a sample of prisoners with a history of
violence, self-harm was more likely to be enacted when external controls evoked
frustration. This emphasises the importance of prison managers ensuring that appropriate
measures are undertaken to prevent intense negative affective experiences or to intervene
when they occur. Promoting professional practice by staff, such as consistency in
enforcing prison regulations and providing predictable routines, might reduce sources of
distress. Assisting prisoners when intense negative affective states are experienced, even
by promoting physical exercise as an appropriate means of regulating affect, might also
assist in reducing the incidence of self-harm.
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Conclusion
The current study has suggested that tendencies to either experience intense affect
or where intense affective experiences are not reduced, risk of suicidal behaviour is
increased. Pending further research into validating measures of affect intensity and affect
regulation, the present study proposes that awareness of the issues associated with these
affective experiences will further assist clinical and correctional staff in reducing selfharm incidents in custodial settings.
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Appendix A -Measures Administered in the Main Study
Modified Affect Intensity Measure (AIM(M))

DIRECTIONS: The following statements describe emotional reactions to different
situations. Please tell me whether these statements are generally true for you NOT AT

ALL, HARDLY EVER, OCCASIONALLY, USUALLY, MOST OF THE
TIME or ALL THE TIME.

NOTATALL

0

HARDLYEVER

1

OCCASIONALLY

2

OFTEN

MOSTOFTHETIME

3

4

ALLTHETIME

5

1. When I'm fed-up, I feel really agitated. _ _
2. When things go right, I feel fantastic. _ _
3. When something happens that makes me look good, I feel really proud. _ _
4. 'Laid-back' could easily describe me. _ _
5. When I get angry, I still think straight and don't freak-out. _ _
6. I get more stressed-out than most other people. _ _
7. When I get nervous, I shake. _ _
8. When I'm happy, I feel pepped-up and excited more than calm and content. _ _
9. If someone stops me doing what I want to do, I feel really annoyed. _ _
10. I tend to overreact to things. _ _
11. I stay calm even on days where everything goes wrong. _ _
12. People that let me down really get to me. _ _
13. When I feel down, I get really upset. _ _
14. I feel quietly satisfied when people tell me I've done well. _ _
15. I feel really hyped-up when something exciting is going to happen. _ _
16. Sad movies really get to me. _ _
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Global Affect Intensity Measure

On a scale from 1 - 10, do you think you're a person who reacts intensely to things, or do
you have fairly mild reactions?

1
Mildly

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Intensely
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The Affect Regulation Strategy Check-list (ARSC)

DIRECTIONS: The following statements describe things you might do to make yourself feel
better when you feel bad, like being depressed, stressed or angry. First state how often you use
each technique with the scale that you used earlier: not at all, hardly ever, occasionally usually,
most of the time, or all the time. Then state how good each technique is at making you feel
better: useless, not much good, fair, good, very good, or excellent.
NOT AT ALL

HARDLY EVER

2

0
USELESS

0

OCCASIONALLY

OFTEN

3

NOT MUCH GOOD

GOOD

3

ALL THE TIME

5

4

FAIR

2

MOST OF THE TIME

VERY GOOD

4

EXCELLENT

5

How often How good

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I tell myself that there's no use feeling this way ........................... _ _ __
I stop myself before I get intensely stressed or depressed ................ _ _ __
I think about the situation in a different way so it doesn't seem so bad_ _ __
Instead of worrying, I try and think about other things .................. _ _ __
I go somewhere to be alone ..................................................._ _ __
I read ............................................................................ _ _ __
I try and joke around with my friends ....................................... _ _ __
8. I cry .............................................................................._ _ ___
9. I go and work really hard ...................................................... _ _ __
10. I do other things with my friends ............................................. _ _ __
11. I talk to friends about my problems .......................................... _ _ __
12. I do sporting activities ......................................................... _ _ __
13. I go and do something like a drawing or a painting ........................ _ _ __
14.Iwatcht.v ....................................................................... _ _ __
15. Itry and work out a way to do something about the problem ............ _ _ __
16. I try to get someone else to help me do something about the problem .. _ _ __
17. I concentrate on trying to think clearly ...................................... _ _ __
18. I concentrate on trying to relax ............................................... _ _ __
19. I use a relaxation technique ................................................... _ _ __
20. I take it out on my belongings ................................................ _ _ __
21. I verbally abuse other people ................................................. _ _ __
22. I hit other people ............................................................... _ _ __
23. I get drunk ....................................................................... _ _ __
24. I take other drugs .............................................................. _ _ __
25. I read a Bible .................................................................... _ _ __
26. I pray ........................................................................... _ _ __
27. I yell ............................................................................ _ _ __
28. I tell myself to ride it through because it will pass ........................ _ _ __
29. I slam doors .................................................................... _ _ __
30. I throw things .................................................................. _ _ __
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Appendix B - Statistical Analyses

(A L P H A)

S C A L E

A NA L Y S I S

R E L I A B I L I T Y

Overall AIM(M)
Reliabili t.y Coefficients
16

N of It.em~:

4 D. D

N of Ca~:es

. 7957

Alpha =

Overall AIM(M)
t-te~:t.s for independent. samples ·of

GROUP

Number
Variable

of Case~:

SD

Mean

SE of Mean

AIM
Mon self harrn
:3el f harm

20

.099
.143

• 4 4 :!
.639

2.07f::l
2.968S

20

Mean Difference= -.8906
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.389

t-test for Equality of Hean:3
Variances
Equal
IJnE·qua.l

t-value
-':, .12
-5.1:2

df

33.83

2-Tail Siq
. 0 0 Ci
.000

P= .246

95%
SE of Diff

.174
.174

CI for Diff
(-1.24:J, -.S,.19)
(-1.244, -.537)
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Analysis of Variance of AlM(M) subscales (positive affectivity, negative intensity, serenity, negative
reactivity) between groups (self-hann and oontrol)
Within-Subjects Factors
Measure: MEASURE 1
Dependent
Variable
NEGINT
NEGREACT

AIMCAT

1
2
3
4

POSITIVE
SERENITY

Between-Subjects Factors

GROUP

Value
Label
Non self
harm
Self harm

0
1

N

20
20

Descriptive Statistics

NEGINT

· NEGREAGT

POSITIVE

SERENITY
~

Std.
Deviation

N

GROUP
Non self
harm

Mean

1.3333

.5948

20

Self harm
Total

2.8833
2.1083

.9599
1.1123

40·

2.6000

1.1476

20

3.2833
2.9417

1.1044
1.1643

20
40

3.3875

.

.7586

20

Totaf

3.4313
3.4094

.9a85
.8"26

20
40

Nonsetf
hsttn

.. 1.3000

- .5609

20

2,2'083

.9030
.. 8730

.20
40

Non self
harm
Self harm
Total
Non self
harm
Self harm

settharm
l1JW

1/1542
..

-

20
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericltt

Measure: MEASURE 1
Within
Subjects
Effect
AIMCAT

Mauchly's

w

Approx.
Chi-SQuare

.694

Sig.

df

5

13.440

Eosilon 8
Greenhouse-Geisser I Huvnh-Feldt

I Lower-bound

.942 I

.852 I

.020

.333

Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is
proportional to an identity matrix.
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are
displayed in the layers (by default) of the Tests of Within Subjects Effects table.
b. Design: lntercept+GROUP
Within Subjects Design: AIMCAT
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

-

Measure: MEASURE 1

Source
AIMCAT

Type Ill
Sum of

Sphericity Assumed
Greenhouse-Geisser
Huynh-Feldt
Lower-bound
Sphericity Assumed
Greenhouse-Geisser

AIMCAT*
GROUP

Huynh-Feldt
Lower-bound
Error(AIMCAT)

Sphericity Assumed
Greenhouse-Geisser
Huynh-Feldt
Lower-bound

Sauares
68.812
68.812
68.812
68.812
11.597
11.597
11.597
11.597
78.196
78.196
78.196
78.196

Mean
Square

df

3
2.555
2.827
1.000
3
2.555
2.827
1.000

114
97.082
107.413
38.000

22.937
26.935
24.344
68.812

33.440
33.440
33.440
33.440

3.866

4.539
4.103
11.597
.686

.805
.728
2.058

a. Computed using a~'.= .05

1...,venfi'S Test of Equality of Error Variancel
F
NEGINT
NEGREACT
POSITIVE
SERENITY

3.254

- .267
3.212
3.853

df1

Sig.

df2

1
1
1
1

38
38
38
38

.079
.608
.081
.057

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent
variable is equal across groups.
a. Design: lntercept+GROUP
VVithln Subjects Design: AIMCAT

F

Sig.
.000
.000
.000

Eta
Squared
.468
.468
.468

.000

.468

5.636

.001

5.636
5.636
5.636

.002
.002
.023

.129
.129
.129
.129

Noncent.

Parameter
100.319
85.431
94.522
33.440
16.907
14.398
15.930
5.636

Observed,

Power8 '
1.000
1.000j

1.(~I
1.000

.9391
.908j

.928!

.638

i
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1
Transformed Variable: Average

Source
Intercept
GROUP
Error

Type Ill
Sum of
Squares
1043.164
25.367
43.365

1

Mean
Square
1043.164

1
38

25.367
1.141

df

a. Computed using alpha = .05

Estimated Marginal Means
1. GROUP

Measure: MEASURE- 1
GROUP
Mean
Non self
2.1552
harm
Self harm
2.9516

Std. Error
.119
.119

2.AIMCAT
Measure: MEASURE 1
AIMCAT
1
2
3
4.

Mean
2.1083
2.9417
3.4094
1.7542

Box's Test of Equality
of Covariance Matrices'
Box's M

F
df1
df2
Sig.

16.270
1.441
10
6904
.156

Tests the null
hypothesis that the
observed covariance
matrices of the
dependent variables
are equal across
groups.
a. Design:
lntercept+GRO
UP
Within Subjects
Design:
AIMCAT

std. Error
.126
.178
.135
.119

914.112

Eta
Sauared
.960

Noncent.
Parameter
914.112

ObseNed

Sig.
.000

22.229

.000

.369

22.229

.996

F

Power8
1.000
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Multivariate Testsl
Effect
AIMCAT

AIMCAT*
GROUP

F

Value
Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
Lambda
HoteHing's
Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
Lambda
Hotelling's
Trace
Roy's
Largest

Hypothesis
df

Eta
Sauared

Sig.

Errordf

Noncent.
Parameter

Observed
Powef

.699

27.919b

3.000

36.000

.000

.699

83.756

1.000

.301

27.919b

3.000

36.000

.000

.699

83.756

1.000

2.327

27.919b

3.000

36.000

.000

.699

83.756

1.000

2.327

27.919b

3.000

36.000

.000

.699

83.756

1.000

.398

7.94l

3.000

36.000

.000

.398

23.826

.982

.602

7.942b

3.000

36.000

.000

.398

23.826

.982

.662

7.942b

3.000

36.000

.000

.398

23.826

.982

.662

7.942b

3.000

36.000

.CX)()

.398

23.826

.982

,,, '

RQq~
a. Computed u~ing alpha = .05

b. Exact statistic
. ',·
c. Design: lntercept+GROUP
Within Subj~ Design: AIMCAT

T-tests comparing groups on positive affectivity, negative intensity, serenity, and negative reactivity on
the AIM(M), and participants' means ARSC scores
-- Independent Samples Test

Levene's Test for
Eaualitv of Variances

F
POSITIVE

Equal
variances
assumed

3.212

Sia.
.081

Equal
variances

not

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Sig.
(2-tailedl

df

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the Mean
Lower

UDDer

-.162

38

.872

-4.37E-02

.2698

-.5900

.5025

-.162

36.401

.872

-4.37E-02

.2698

-.5908

.5033

-3.821

38

.000

-.9083

.2377

-1.3895

-.4271

-3.821

31.762

.001

-.9083

.2377

-1.3927

-.4240

-6.139

38

.000

-1.5500

.2525

-2.0612

-1.0388

-6.139

31.717

.000

-1.5500

.2525

-2.0645

-1.0355

-1.919

38

.063

-.6833

.3561

-1.4043

3.761E-02

-1.919

37.944

.063

-.6833

.3561

-1.4043

3.765E-02

-5.123

38

.000

-.8906

.1739

-1.2426

-.5387

-5.123

33.827

.000

-.8906

.1739

-1.2440

-.5372

1.025

38

.312

.8637

.8424

-.8416

2.5691

1.025

37.980

.312

.8637

.8424

-.8416

2.5691

assumed
SERENITY

Equal
variances
assumed

3.853

.057

Equal
variances
not
assumed
NEGINT

NEGREACT

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed

.

3.254

.267

.079

.608

Equal
variances
not
assumed
AIM

Equal
variances
assumed

1.389

.246

Equal
variances
not
assumed
COPE

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not

.153

.698

r
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T-test comparing groups on global affect intensity scores
Number
of Cases

Variable

Mean

SD

SE of Mean

GLOPJ,L
Non c;el f harm
::: e 1 f harm

Mean Difference

20
20

,-, c,--,
1 • LO J
2. 206

4.4500
7. 3750

.493

= -2. 92':'iCI

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1::.115

t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Siq
Equal
un,.~qual

- ~). l'.::
- 5. 12

SE of Diff

P= .007

95%
CI for Diff

• ~:,71
. 571

• ODO

(-4.0131, -1.769)
(-4.090, -1.760)
·----------------------------·-----

• oO0

'JO. 59

T-test comparing groups on mean strategy scores on the ARSC
Number
of Casec;

Variable

Mean

SD

SE of Mean

STPJ,TEGY
control
self-harm

30

6.8317
5.7597

3 !)

Mean Difference

,1. 4 0 0
2. !) 11)

. :367

1.0720

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 35.439 P= .000

t--test for Equality ,:,f Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

.no

l. :: 1

l.21

t.ji).

60

SE ,:,f Diff

95%
CI for Diff
(-.1:,9C,
1;-.712,

2.t:4C1,i
2.8~;6)
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T-tests comparing groups on scores for the thirty ARSC items.
Number
of Cac:es

\lariabl 8
Pl

Mean

SE of Mean

SD

Tell InT::elf

Non !:;elf harm
Self harm

9.1000
4.6750

20

20

r:,. 739
5.695

1. 283
1. 273

Mean Difference= 4.4250
Levene'c: Tec:t for Equality of Variancec:: F= .101
t--test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Siq

:! . y ':i

Equal
Unequal

2.45

1. 80(::
1.. E: 0 :::

.019

.019

38. 0 0

Number
of Case.:;

Variable
P2

95%
SE of Diff

CI for Diff
(.764,

Mean

SD

SE of Mean

Stop myc;elf

}Jon c:elf harm
:3elf harm
Mean Difference

20
20

7.7000
6.1.500

6. 367

1. 42 4
1. 31.4

5.87B

1. ':,500

P= .449

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .585
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequa_l

. 80

38

.429

·n. 76

.429

t-te::-ts for independent samples of

95%
SE of Diff

CI f,:,r Diff

(-2.37,J, S.47:J)
(-2.374, 5.474)

1. 93:3

GROUP

Number
of Case:3

Variable
P3

t!.OJ36)

(.764, E:.086)

SE of Mean

SD

Mean

Think different

Non self harm

Self harm

20
20

9.6000

6.557

1.466

':,. 3SOD

4. 8 Cl 4

1. (17,J

Mean Difference= 4.2500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.559

t-test for Equality of 1'1eanc:
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequal

2.34
2.34

38

.025

34.84

• Cl2S

SE of Diff
1. 818
1. 818

P= .219
9r:,%
CI for Diff

(.570, 7.9:30)
( . 559,

7.941)
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Number
of Cases

variable
P4

SE of Mean

SD

Mean

Think other things
9.6500
7.7500

20
20

:3el f harm
Self harm

Non

1. 424
1. ~,O 1

6. :368
6. 711

Mean Difference = 1.9000
P= • 711

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .140

9:':,%

t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

.92
.92

]7.

• :164

90

t-tests for independent samples of

(-2.289,

6.IHJ9)

(-2.2139,

6.089)

GROUP

Number
of Cases

Variable
P5

2.069
2.069

• 364

3 :3

CI for Diff

SE of Diff

SD

Mean

SE ,)f Mean

Be alone

Non self harm
Self harm

10.0500

20
20

7.674
6.849

8.2000

1. 716

1. 5:11

Mean Difference = l.E:500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .288
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

95%

SE of Diff

CI for Diff

. 80

38

.426

2. 300

(-2.807, 6.507)

• 8 Cl

37.52

.426

2. 300

(-2.807,

Number
of Cases

Variable
PG

P= .594

6.507)

Mean

SD

:3E of Mean

6. 2000
t: 50 D

7.:365
.'::!. 761

1.759

Read

Non .self harm
Self harm

20

20

:1 •

Mean Difference = 2. 350 0
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .660
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

l. 08
1. Cl :3

38

P= • 422

95%

5E of Diff
2. mo
2. lt:D

CI for Diff
(-2.064,
(-2. 076,

6.764)
6. 776)
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t-tests for independent samples of
Number
of Case:3

Variable
P7

GROUP

.'m

Mean

SE of Mean

-Joke with friends

Non self harm
Self harm

12. 2500

20
20

7. 718
)3. 329

7.7000

1. 726

Mean Difference= 4.5500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .:361
t.-t.e::;t. for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequal

1. 79
1.79

95%
CI for Diff

SE of Diff
2.5]9
2.539

. 081
.0(::1

:J 8
37 .. 7 )3

P= .551

(-.591,
(-.:,91,

9.691)
9.691)

Number
Variable
Pl':

Mean

of Ca:3e:::

SD

:3E of Mean

Cry

Non self liarrn
Self harrn

1. 650 IJ
4. E:,00

20
20

.874
1. 024

J. 911
4. 5:3 0

Mean Difference = -2.5000
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.484
t-test. for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

-1.86
-1. 86

t-tests for inclepsndent sample.s- of

1. 347
1. ]47

:oelt l1arm
Self harm

Non

Mean Difference

CI for Diff
(-5.227,
(-5.2'.'.:9,

.227)
.229)

GROUP

NurrD::,er
of Cases

Variable

9::,%

SE of Diff

.071
.071

]7.09

P= .231

20
20

Mean

SD

11. 6500
9. 42~'i0

7.443
7. 690

:::E of Mea.n

1.664
1. 720

2.2250

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .021

t-t.est for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Sig
Equ.c,l

Unequal

. 3 5fJ

.9J
:.:7. 96

95%

SE of Diff
2 .. :393

CI for Diff
(-?.621, 7.071)
(-~'..621,

7 .. 071)
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Nurnber
Variable
PlO

:3E of Mean

Mean

of Cases

Thincrs 1,,.ith friends

Non self harm
Self harm

20

10.5500

6. :370

20

6. 5'::,00

6. :,01

1. 424
1. 4 '::,4

M"ean Difference= 4.0000
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .046
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

1.97

SE of Diff

. 057
. 0:: 7

1. 97

9~:,%
CI for Diff

(-.121, 8.121)

:2. 035

(-.121,

1

t-t8:3t:3 for indepenclent :3arnple:o of

P= . S:32

t:.121)

GRDUP

Number
Variable
Pll

Mean

of case:3

SE of Mean

SD

Talk friends

Non :3 elf harm
self harm

20
20

1. 162
1. 74 :!

5.195
7. 797

4. 41)1)0

'::,. 4 500

M'c'an Difference = -1. 0500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variance:o: F= .417
t-test for Equality of Means
Varianc'='s t-value
df
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequal

SE of Diff

-.50

·:, 0

..) u

.619

2 . 095

-.so

]3.09

.620

2.095

P= .522

CI for Diff

(-5.292,
(-5.3U,

3.192)
3.213)

Nurru:,er
Me.an

SD

15. 70 D0

7.658

1. 712

7.47~:,0

7.440

1. 664

cJf Cases

P12

Sport

ilon :3e,lf harm
Self harm
M,,,.in

:=::E of Mean

Difference

20
20

::J ..

2250

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .271
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

3. '15
:; • 4 5

SE of Diff

.001

2. :3 ~37

• 0 Cl 1

2. 3t:7

P= .605

Cl

for Diff

(3.391,
('.LJ91,

13.059)
U.0'::,9)
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t-tests for independent :3amples of
Number
of Case:3

Variable
P1:3

GROUP

Mean

SE of Mean

SD

Draw

Non self harm
Self harm

2. 6000
5.8500

20
20

l. OS7
1.722

4. [360

7. 700

Mean Difference= -3.2500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.807
t-test for Equality of Means
variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

-1. 60
-1. 60

3 ft
32. 07

P= .021

95%

:3E of Diff

CI for Diff

2. 036
2.03 15

.119
.120

(-7.373,

.t:73)

(-7.398, .898)

Nurnber
Variable
Pl4

Mean

of c·ase.s

SE of Mean

SD

TV

Non self harm
Self harm

20
20

10. oOOD

6.181

6.1::000

6 .110

1.382
1.366

Mean Difference= 3.2000
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .155
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail ;::ig·
Equal
Unequal

1. 65
1.65

95%

SE of Diff

.108
. 10 8

]7.99

t-test:3 for independent :3amples of

P= .696

1. 943

1.943

CI for Diff
(-.7:35,
(-.735,

7.13.5)
7.135)

GROUP

Nurru::,e:r

Variable
P15

Wc•rk

of Cases

Mean

SE of Mean

it c,ut

Non self harm
Self J-iarm

20
20

10. 9500

(:,. 970

6.8000

6. :.\87

1. 55ti
1. 4213

Mean Difference= 4.1500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .157
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

. 057

l. 9G

1.96

37.71

.057

P=

.. 695

9.5%

:3E of Diff
2. 114
2 .114

CI for Diff
(-.130, :::.430)
(-.130,

8.4:JD)
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Number
of Cases

Variable

P16

SE of Mean

Mean

:~:omeone else

Non :3elf harm
Self harm

2.3500
4.1000

20
20

.525
. 929

2.346
4.154

Mean Difference = -1. 7500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.7DO

t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

-1. 64

-1.64

t-test:3 for independent :3amples of

P17

(-3.91D,
(-3.929,

1. 067
1. 067

.410)
.429)

GROUP

Nurnber
of Cases

Variable

95%
CI for Diff

SE of Diff

. 10 9
.111

38
3 Cl. 0 0

P= .022

SE of Mean

SD

Mean

Think clearly

Non self harm
Self harm

20
20

8.306
4. 850

11.4000
5.9500

1. 857
1. 085

Mean Difference= 5.45DD
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 4.424

t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequal

2. 53

..Ju

--:;, 0

. 016

2.151

:rn . 61

. 017

2. 1:,1

Number
of Cases

Variable
P18

:3E of Diff

Mean

P= .042

95%
CI for Diff
(1.095,
(1.06:.:,

SD

9.:::05)
9.t:37)

SE of Mean

Relaz

Non self harm
Self harm

12.2500
6.7500

20
20

7.419
7.04G

1 . 659
l. 57 6

Mean Difference = 5 ..5000
Levene's Te:3t for Equality of Variances: F= .171

t-tec:t f,:ir Equality of M1c;ans
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

2. 1.JO
2.40

.021
37. 90

.on

SE of Diff
2. 2 :0:,:
.-, • -., Go

P= .681

95%
CI for Diff
(.:367, 10.lJ:3)
(.'d67, 10.lB)
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t-te:3t:3 fc,r independent :3arnple:3 of
Number
of Ca:3es

Variable
P19

GROUP

:::E of l.,.Iean

Mean

Relaxation

N,.:,n :3elf harm
Self harm

20

9. 400 0

9.456

2 .114

20

:',. 1500

5 .. 896

1.3H:

Mean Difference= 4.2500
Levene':3 Test for Equality of Variance:3: F= 7.692
t-t.est. for Equality of Meant;
Variance:3 t-value
elf
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

1. 71
1. 71

31.84

P= .009

CJ':',%
CI for Diff

SE of Diff

.. 0 96

2.492

(-.795,

9.295)

• (I Ci :3

2. 492

(-.r:27,

9.J27)

Number
Variable
P2D

Mean

c)f Ca.se:3

:3E of Mean

SD

Belon9inqs

Non self ha.rm
Self harm

20

. 70 00

2.250

20

3.6000

6. 954

• 50:3

Mean Difference= -2.9000
Levene':3 Te:3t for Equality of Variance:3: F= 8.418
t-t.est for Equality of Means
\,'.cuiance?s t-valuE·
elf
2-Tail Sj_i~r
Equal
Unequal

-1. 77
-1. 77

22.94

.089

t-tes ts fc,r inclependen t s arnples. of

Variable
P21

SE of Diff

P= .006

CI for Di ff

1.U4

(-6.209,

.409)

1. 6:14

(-6.2t:2,

.4B2)

GROUP

Number
of Ca:3e:3

Mean

SD

SE of Mean

Verbal abuse

Non self harm
Self harm

20
20

l.BOOO
6. 9000

2.191
Cl. 277

• 4 90
2. C,7 4

Mean Difference= -5.1000
Levene's Test for Equality of Variance:3: F= 27.810 P= .000

t-test for Equality of Means
variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Sig

95%

CI for Diff
-------·-···----------·-·--·-----------·-·---·------------------------------(-9.416, -.784)
.022
2 .132
Equal
(-9.~<34, -.666)
2. 132
. 026
--2. 3 9
21.11
Unequal
SE

of Diff
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Number
of Cases

Variable
P22

Mean

:3D

1.1500

1.599
5. 061

SE of Mean

Hit people

Non self harm
Self harm
Mean Difference

20
20

.357

1.132

-2.4375

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 10.314 P= .003
95%

t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

-2.1)5

3S

22. 7:.1
-2. 0",
---·---·----------

• 047

1.187

(-4.841,

-.034)

52

1. H:7

(-4.:::9::,

.OH:)

• (I

t-te:3ts for independent samples of

\Iariable
P23

CI for Diff

SE of Diff

GROUP

Number
of Cases

SD

Mean

SE of Mean

Drunt

Non self harm
SeJ f harm

1.392

5.3501)

20
20

7.6500

10.070

2.252

Mean Difference= -2.3000
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 9.242
t-test for Equality ,)f Mean::
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequal

SE of Diff

- . ::n

.390

2.647

- • )~)7

. 391

2.647

\Tariable

P2 4

Number
of Cases

Mean

P= .D04

CI for Diff
3.060)
(-7.694, 3.094)

(-7.660,

SD

SE of Mean

Druq:3

N)n self harm
Self harrn

8. 500 D
20
10.4t:6
2 .. ] 45
20
9.6000
2.124
9. "100
·---------------- ----·-----

Mean Difference= -1.1000
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .690
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Siq
Equa.l
Unr:,qual

- . :35

• 730

.no

P= . 411

%%
SE

of Di.ff
3.164
3.Hi4

Cl for Diff
(-7.506,
(-7 . 506,

5.306)
5.]06)
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t-tes ts for independent samples of

GROUP

Nurru:ier

P25

Mean

SD

SE of Mean

1.8500

4.614
4.169

1. 032

of Ca:3es

Variable
Bible

Non :3elf harm
Self harm

20
20

1.7000

. 9]2

Mean Differen,:e = .1500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .069

t-t.ec:t for Equality of Mean:::
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

.11
.11

:3 B
37.61

P= .794

95%
CI for Diff

SE of Diff

.915

1. 391

.915

1. 391

(-2.666, 2.966)
(-2 . 666, 2.966)

Number

Variable
P26

Mean

SD

20

3 .1000

20

1.9000

6.537
4. 4 :16

of Ca:3es

SE of Mean

Pray

Non self harm
Self harm

l. 462
.992

Mean Difference= 1.2000
Levene':3 Test for Equality of Variances: F= 3.190

t.-tec:t for Equality of Mean:::
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

Variable
P27

(-2.377, 4.777)

l. 766
1. 766

. 51)1

t-tests for independent samples ,:,f

95%
CI for Diff

SE (,f Diff

. '::,02

:13. 4 4

P= .082

4.795)

(-2.:1'.:.i'.'),

GROUP

Nurru::,er
of Ca:3e:3

Mean

SD

3. 4500
6. 9000

8 .. 534

SE of Mean

Yell

Non self harm
SE,lf harm

20
20

l. 215
1. ~I[!:,:

-'3. 4 50 0

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.511
t.-t.est for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Sig
-------··-------··-·---·-·------·-------··------·-·--··-----·--·
Equal
-1. 53
.136
Unequal
-1. 53
.137

:::E of Diff

P= .024

95%
CI for Di ff

----·-·····-·--····----------------------------

~.262

(-::J.031,
(-8.0: 9,
1

l.131)
1 . 1::19)

Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm
Number
of Cases

Variable
P2 8

SE of Mean

:=rn

Mean

Ride it through

Non :,elf h.arrn
Self harm

20

9.7500

20

2. ':lOOO

1. 938

8.669

:l. 905

Hea-11 Difference = 6. 8500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 15.149 P= .000

t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Siq
Equal
Unequal

3.22
3.22

26.41

.003

2 .126

• 0 Cl:!

2 .126

t-te:3ts for independent :3ampls,s of

9::,%
CI for Diff

SE .:,f Diff

(2.545, 11.155)
(2.479, 11.221)

GROUP

Numb er
Variable
P2 9

:3E of Mean

SD

Hean

of Ca.ses

Slam ck,ors

Non .self harm
Self harm

20

1.6000

2 . ]71

.530

20

::, • 2250

B. 2 9~.I

1. e:.s:::,

Mean Difference= -3.6250
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.296 P= .000
t-t.est for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail :3ig
Equal
Unequal

. 06ti

-1.BB
-1.

c::::

SE of Diff

22. 0 r:::

l. 929
1. 92 9

. 073

CI for Diff

(-7.531,

.2Eil)

(·-7 .. 627,

.377)

Number
variable
P30

of Ca:3e:3

:::E of Mean

Mean

Throw thin~5

20

!Jon self harm
Self harm

. 2500

.550

20
LJ.~:ooo
---------------------------

Mean Difference

.123
1. 6(17
---------------

-3.9500

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.766 P= .000
t-te::t for Equa.1.i ty
Variances t-value
df

Equal

~-. 4 :::,
. ,j",

19.22

,:,f

lvJeans
2-Tail Sig

95%
:::E of Diff

CI for Di ff

.019

1.612

(-7.213, --.687)

• (1}'1

1. i:;u

(,-7.3~~1,

-.576)

92
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Reliability scores for mean product scores (frequency x effectiveness scores) for interaction,
distraction, cognition, and aggressive strategy scales on the ARSC
Intera,:tion stratec:ries - product items
Reliability Coefficients

n

of Cases

N of Items

40. !J

Alpha =

4

. 4 30 4

R E L I A B I L I T Y

r:

ANALY' 0 I:::

5

A L E

(A L P H A)

A N A L Y S I S

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

P.f-lial>:ili t·y7 Cc:,,sffic:ients
I\T
.,

,-.,

-f

.... .L

(--,
'.:l c.•
·.,·<....-<--'

CC'
·-

.__,

R E L I A B I L I T Y

Cognitive strategies - Product
Reliability Coefficients
l\f of c-:ases

Alpha=

40.0

N of Items

8

. 1357]

R E L I A B I T

T

T

Y

A N A L Y S I :3

.S C A L E

aggressive strategies - product scores
Reliability Coefficients
N ,~,f Ca:,,es

Alpha =-

40.0
.8732

N of Items

6

(A L P H A)
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GROUP

j :,~,::: :: v:o:t::,::::::::le:t p:,::~:::s

l

of

Number
of Cases

Variable

Mean

SE of Mean

MEi'-J,JCOG
Non self harm
Self harm

20

4.855

10. 0500
S.7906

20

1. 0E:6
• !':4 4

:I. 77S

Mean Difference= 4.2594
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.266
t-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value
df
2-Tail Sig
Equal
Unequal

3 .10

.004

3.10

• 004

t-te:3ts for independent samples of

SE ,)f Diff

P= .268

CI for Diff
(1.475, 7.0411)
(1.470, 7.049)

l. 375
1. 37S

GROUP

A,:rqre:3:3ive str."teqie:3 - product mean sc,.:,u?s
Number
Mean
of Cas~s
Variable

SD

SE of Mean

-----~---------------------------------------------------

MEMJAGG

Non .c;elf harm
Self ha.rm

1. 424
6. 04'.::'.

l. 4917
5. 061:::3

20
20

1. 351

Mean Differen,:e = -'3. 5771
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 16.676 P= .000
t-te:c;t for Equality ,:,f Means
Variances t-value
elf
2-Tail Siq
Ec:jUa.1

-2.5B

Unequal

-2.58

21.10

.014
.018

95%

SE of Diff
1. 3 Bf:l

CI f,)r Di ff
(-6 . J8B,
(-6.46°1,

- . 767)
-.690)

,v

?) 7?
, j LI

J
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